# Untitled

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## 1. A debate?

A wave of media reports and broadcasts – from 4 Corners to talkback radio – is warning that ‘high levels’ of immigration threaten our lifestyles.[[1]](#endnote-1)

The sentiment is popular among those willing to express their feelings; apparently deeply held convictions about migration or population ‘problems’ being kicked off by all sorts of topics.[[2]](#endnote-2)

Much of this seems an overblown monologue of woe.

For example: one argument has migrant enhanced population choking Sydney which, in 30 years, will have a population of up to 8 million – supposedly comparable with London or New York. However, such a population would be a million less than presently in central London or New York, in an area 10 to 15 times larger. Few mention Tokyo or Shanghai – whose populations currently exceed all of Australia – the latter in an area half the size of Sydney.[[3]](#endnote-3)

Another example: we are presented with a simple (half) equation - more people means more infrastructure. How can Australia afford this? The answer is in the other, ignored, part of the simple equation – more people means more ability to pay for infrastructure etc.[[4]](#endnote-4)

With such perspectives ignored, we are told crowded transport infrastructure heralds a ‘watershed’ moment for big cities.[[5]](#endnote-5)

The supposed watershed seems to cleave the discussion into vociferous calls for more infrastructure or less migration. This is sometimes accompanied by speculation about motives of people who hold the ‘wrong’ view – racists or rent seekers if you like. That’s the way to start a reasonable conversation!

Population hyperbole is no news in Western Sydney. For years electors have been told roads are congested because of surging migration – amid local MPs doing their bit to repulse the hordes …… including being piped on board patrol boats in Darwin.[[6]](#endnote-6)

A former Liberal Prime Minister (from Sydney’s northern beaches) and a former Labor Premier (from Sydney’s eastern suburbs) - are prominent in stirring the population pot.[[7]](#endnote-7)

The latter, of ‘Sydney is full’ (circa 2000 and a million people fewer than today) fame, recently focused on the small area of Sydney’s eastern suburbs to raise possibilities of rationing access to walking trails and fences and turnstiles at beaches.[[8]](#endnote-8)

Those complaining about Sydney surfside traffic might recall his Government’s 1999 kyboshing a rail line to Bondi Beach – a proposal reportedly supported by the Commonwealth. The demise of the proposal was welcomed by eastern suburbanites whose view about a railway reducing a local park may have some validity but whose claims it would make little difference to traffic are harder to believe. [[9]](#endnote-9)

The potential crowds brought by a railway – ‘westies’ - was a probable major concern, even though there are plenty of backpackers in the area.

Westies not migrants? The term ‘elite localism’ has been coined to cover relatively unexamined attempts to deny ‘the masses’ or ‘others’ access to places such as Sydney’s beaches:

*where the Sydneysiders of the 19th century acted with an increasing confidence that the beach and foreshore was the ‘rightful heritage of all Australians’, their mid-late 20th century Eastern Suburbs successor’s actions implied that the beach was the rightful heritage of a specific, wealthy, exclusive group of Australians – elite locals*.[[10]](#endnote-10)

Interestingly enough, Sydney’s northern beaches and eastern suburbs areas were cited as the examples of the elite localism phenomenon.

The beagle’s *Salute to the toilet gang* alluded to the matter, albeit in the 1970s near Cronulla. The much later Cronulla ‘riot’ provided new ammunition for elite localism arguments at other beaches: the riot was at the railway station, ergo no station no riot, hence no railway to my beach please.[[11]](#endnote-11)

Maybe the ‘three cities in Sydney’ proposed by another eastern Sydneysider, the Chair of the Greater Sydney Commission Ms Turnbull, will help quell the ongoing angst about outsiders by setting new obstacles to cross-metropolitan travel. Obstacles, such as requirements for passengers to frequently interchange or lack of seating on trains, might encourage people to stay where they belong.[[12]](#endnote-12)

More considered contributions, such as by Ross Gittins, queried some of the motives and claimed economic benefits of migration at current levels. Mr Gittins echoed the common view that migration is causing infrastructure problems.[[13]](#endnote-13)

John Menadue pointed to the large positive contribution made by migrants to our way of life. He suggests concerns about population and infrastructure relate to planning.[[14]](#endnote-14)

Luke Fraser claimed policy is more of a problem for infrastructure than migration; noting some countries with high migration worry much less about infrastructure.[[15]](#endnote-15)

The migration v. infrastructure policy debate is one the beagle considers worth attention. We hear incessantly about the migration side. What about the possibility that transport policy leads to (perceptions of) crowding on infrastructure?

Three matters suggest it does: transport planning; structures; pricing.

The ‘debate’ also has largely ignored the potential for second tier cities to mitigate capital city growth; and the policies that operate against this potential.

## 2. Transport Planning

### 2.1 Government planning

There is no national transport plan worthy of the name. Attempts to start one have been doggedly resisted by State Governments and Canberra’s bureaucracy. Rail is an example.[[16]](#endnote-16)

Given Federal arrangements there is little hope of progress until the Commonwealth takes on the role envisaged by the Constitution rather than doing whatever it feels like – guided by pirate Jack Sparrow’s compass.[[17]](#endnote-17)

Attempts at joint Commonwealth-State transport planning have conspicuously failed; in aggregate and, in the case of Western Sydney, in detail.[[18]](#endnote-18)

In the absence of national direction, Australian exhibits examples of disgraceful sub-national transport planning led by an infatuation with road building.

### 2.2 Roads

The biggest Australian cities have new motorways pointing towards CBDs – in defiance of principles adopted overseas since the 1960s. These are virtually guaranteed to increase congestion throughout the main road network with or without induced aggregate traffic or population growth.[[19]](#endnote-19)

Central motorway congestion is exacerbated by under-scoping roads needed for trucks. Sub-optimal geometry – gradients, curvature and lane size – causes trucks to slow and impedes braking and acceleration with flow on effects to other traffic. Under-scoping also leads to excessive numbers of partially loaded trucks. Sydney offers classic examples such as the M5 motorway.[[20]](#endnote-20)

Options to mitigate impacts on congestion, such as truck only lanes, have not been seriously considered. Rather the management of Australian roads, unlike the management of any other form of transport infrastructure, encourages mixed traffic. This increases congestion and maximises the perceived need to build more roads.[[21]](#endnote-21)

Then there are arrangements to preclude public transport options, or competition, against preferred roads. This includes congestion-causing traffic funnelling.[[22]](#endnote-22)

Traffic funnelling effects are likely to be far more pervasive than the assumed commercial support for motorways. Traffic calming - roundabouts, go-slow and school zones - by redirecting traffic from local to main roads is a form of traffic funnelling.

Many new and redeveloped suburbs have roads too narrow to accommodate buses, ergo several cars per dwelling. This in the name of ‘densification’ a catchcry of today’s town-planners.[[23]](#endnote-23)

These matters at least partly explain the seeming paradox of very slow growth in aggregate road use – even with ‘record immigration’ - while congestion is thought to be increasing.[[24]](#endnote-24)

Another likely factor in the paradox is driver behaviour. Statistics provide tantalising support of common anecdotes of worsening driver behaviour - recent increases in the rate of road trauma per unit of travel. A recent new behaviour is mobile phone use in traffic. Planning has failed to take this into account.[[25]](#endnote-25)

Over-estimation of demand for new motorways is relatively common. This is hardly a sign of roads being overloaded by population.[[26]](#endnote-26)

Growth in road spending since 2000 has far outstripped road use and road related revenues. This is not supportive of a view that aggregate population growth is a key factor behind any increased network congestion. It may be that (uneconomic) congestion has increased in locations where population growth has been relatively high. If so, given the aggregate picture, this indicates the problem to be misdirected resources rather than population.[[27]](#endnote-27)

### 2.3 How bad is planning? Ports

Transport and road planning can be arcane, with most relevant data and projections hidden from the public. It is difficult to determine just how bad planning is, or the size of its deleterious effects.

However, there are clues.

The most important transport planning activities relate to sea ports. This reflects their relative immobility, scale of activity and infrastructure requirements of fleets. Sea ports are the reference for most other transport; those activities fit around the port.

Approaches to the port from the sea and land are relatively fixed. They are simple to plan. So there are opportunities and strong motives for good port planning.

However, port hinterlands feature planning neglect. A result is capital city ports facing severe landside – road and rail – problems evidenced by high and increasing landside costs.[[28]](#endnote-28)

Some city ports are in locations nearing their use-by date, others face urban encroachment. Around Australia communities have been led to believe port activities will be constrained, and have been angered when this has not eventuated.[[29]](#endnote-29)

There are cases where ports in second tier cities have been prevented from competing for – reducing – cargo and therefore prevented from mitigating traffic in the centre of capital cities.[[30]](#endnote-30)

The absence of Commonwealth interest in planning for international seaports is in stark contrast to international airports. Meanwhile not only has no Government conformed to the simple planning principles of the national approach to ports they agreed in 2011, but officials have ignored reporting requirements.[[31]](#endnote-31)

It is not possible to have a credible freight policy without a clear view as to port planning. Covering-up these failures are never-ending Commonwealth and State reviews into ‘logistics’. A consequence of planning failures is excessive numbers of under-loaded freight vehicles in the most heavily congested central urban areas.

## 3. Structural reform

The term ‘structure’ refers to the way in which organisations conduct activities. Relevant matters include organisation scope, the number of organisations in an industry, and controls – government and otherwise – over organisations. Structural reform involves changing these matters.

Prior to the 1980s many transport activities were conducted within government by public authorities under the day-to-day control of a Minister. Day-to-day control could be exercised by directions not made in the public eye.[[32]](#endnote-32)

From the mid 1980s many of these activities – except control of roads – have been moved to organisations at arms-length from Ministers. The idea is for these organisations to behave as if they were privately owned. It should be a small step from that to privatisation. Ministers do not exercise day-to-day control of these organisations except by public direction – although have been some exceptions of Governments attempting to keep some directions secret.[[33]](#endnote-33)

Originally the ideas behind this included: to improve democratic accountability – by making Government influence explicit; to increase economic efficiency by creating a ‘level playing field’ in markets where government and private businesses competed; to reduce public sector business costs and especially subsidies.

The last of these ideas implied reform would be limited to organisations with simple processes, no scale or scope economies and which supply mature or declining markets.

However, the ‘reforms’ extended to complex organisations in fluctuating markets. The withdrawal of Ministerial control was not always adequately replaced by regulation and contracts. Some organisations were split-up in an attempt to ‘reform’ what could be reformed before being re-reformed into integrated organisations again.[[34]](#endnote-34)

Results include that capital renewal, let alone expansion, has not been handled well. The regulatory/service procurement/contracts systems needed to pre-empt ‘capital shortages’ or get the right equipment have been eschewed in favour of headlines such as privatisation proceeds. Government departments are directly involved in capital purchases.

There are numerous current examples in most Australian cities: emergence of infrastructure maintenance deficits corrected by government funded recapitalisation; fleet being initially discarded then reintroduced in demand ‘crises’; purchase of unsuitable assets.

The public experience the effects of this industry mismanagement as service degradation and crowding – even when demand is not growing strongly.[[35]](#endnote-35)

## 4. Pricing

Crowding means things are popular; in a sense it is a sign of ‘success’. The first, and best, response to chronic unwelcome crowding is pricing. Infrastructure requirements cannot be properly determined unless pricing is factored in.[[36]](#endnote-36)

The prolonged failure to consider beneficiary charging/pricing is convenient to rent seekers and the infrastructure club. It is a further reflection of failures by Governments to create institutional arrangements needed to properly manage limited resources; with consequent sleight of hand spending of your money, often on the wrong things in the wrong places for the wrong reasons.

Among the results of ignoring pricing is capacity being added in places where it is not necessary, and not added in places where necessary. A case in point is NSW Metro; construction of an enormously expensive Metro in north-west suburbia does not address any capacity issue, reduces capacity in some places and ignores notorious long term severe capacity constraints on the western and Illawarra lines. [[37]](#endnote-37)

This is not to say pricing is suitable or feasible in all places.[[38]](#endnote-38)

## 5. Second tier cities

The above discussion points to policy failures that increase congestion and feelings of crowding by omission: absence of plans; failure to establish proper structural arrangements; ignoring economic principles.

These adverse effects are amplified by policy failures by commission; retarding the prospects of second tier cities - like Newcastle, Geelong, Wollongong and Townsville.

By and large State and Commonwealth Governments have been pandering to big city interests for some time. The NSW’s Government’s anti-competitive restriction preventing Newcastle from having a container terminal is perhaps the worst recent case – but there are plenty of others.[[39]](#endnote-39)

State Governments are notoriously beholden to capital city merchant interests – and have been since colonial days.

Examples include: railway routes and breaks of gauge to funnel trade towards capital city ports and away from alternative centres; strangulation of the port of Eden; disputes over the site of the national capital.[[40]](#endnote-40)

While Federation was intended to reduce this introversion, the Commonwealth is not operating as an adequate counter-balance. It had made attempts through seeking to encourage rural and inland ‘growth centres’ in the 1960s and 1970s, but since the change in national direction in the 1980s – to ‘international competitiveness’ – this has lagged. Admittedly the approach to decentralisation had limited success, and other centres – especially on the coast rather than inland – have grown much more rapidly since.[[41]](#endnote-41)

More recent Commonwealth urban policy has not articulated purposes other than vague matters such as supporting State Government efforts to improve ‘liveability’ and focussed on the capital cities – where most people live.[[42]](#endnote-42)

A signature policy - ‘city deals’ – which might have been hoped to spread development is looking superficial; a way of gaining political kudos for potentially ultra-vires funding like for football grounds.[[43]](#endnote-43)

The ‘city deal’ concept has been extended to Western Sydney but there its key transport aspects are weak. They will be discussed in a later post; for now it is worth noting the big NSW Government projects, $40bn or so – Northconnex, WestConnex, Sydney Metro etc. – serve the east of the metropolitan area. As does the revised $2bn or so knock-down/rebuild stadium policy. The projects reinforce the dominance of the CBD and could well increase congestion – even without population growth - in the eastern parts of the city.

The recent announcement of Commonwealth support for a NSW study of ‘faster rail’ between Newcastle and Sydney is an example of the Commonwealth lazily supporting whatever a State says. Instead of its 2-hour travel time target to the CBD it should be examining a 1-hour trip target to a major node in the metropolitan area – like Hornsby or Chatswood. [[44]](#endnote-44)

If State Governments continue to sabotage the future of second tier cities – abetted by the Commonwealth - of course the big cities will get bigger. With or without international migration.

## 6. Conclusion

With that perspective, I am sceptical about so-called ‘economic infrastructure’ arguments opposed to migration.

Some proponents of these views ask for a ‘slowdown’. Doesn’t this just mean all the alleged problems will still occur a little later?

Others want to permanently avoid such ‘problems’ and set a limit to Australia’s population – perhaps to that when Sydney was ‘full’ – some 5 million less than now. I suggest they urge better planning and infrastructure charging. There is always an option to do something honourable and practical about the scourge of Australian population growth – emigrate.

J Austen

5 April 2018

1. E.g. <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-12/australia-is-struggling-to-handle-its-swelling-population/9535116> [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. <https://www.thejadebeagle.com/purgatory.html> [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Population and areas from google.com; Sydney, New York City, Shanghai, Tokyo [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. Provided the average productivity of migrants is at least the average productivity of the indigenous population, migration would increase the capacity to provide infrastructure by at least as much as increased demand for infrastructure use (in the absence of scale effects) etc. There may be a timing issue of a lag between migrant arrivals and finding work; assessment of the national capacity to provide infrastructure during that period would need to take account use of migrant imported resources e.g. personal savings. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. <http://infrastructureaustralia.gov.au/policy-publications/publications/files/future-cities/Future-Cities-Summary-Report-2018.pdf> [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. <https://www.theaustralian.com.au/archive/politics/julia-gillards-gunboat-diplomacy/news-story/1c1469a2b9a912445f2745b25d6a4a64?sv=750e2a96b5d299a925111e694ee6dfb1> [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. Prime Minister Abbott <https://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/immigration/tony-abbotts-call-to-cut-migrant-intake/news-story/f3cf7e4f418d90685d0bd61cdc11a0a6>

NSW Premier Carr <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-02-16/bob-carr-says-cut-australias-immigration-by-at-least-a-third/7174506> [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. <https://au.news.yahoo.com/a/39492588/bondi-beach-turnstiles-as-aust-population-grows-bob-carr-says/> [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. <http://www.bondivillage.com/trains.htm>. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. Elite Localism and Inequality: Understanding affluent community opposition to rail network expansion within the political economy of Sydney. Jarrod Avila 2016

<https://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/bitstream/2123/16653/2/Jarrod%20Avila%20Honours%20Thesis%20Final.pdf> [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. <https://www.thejadebeagle.com/sydney-salutes-the-toilet-gang.html>. Cronulla riots were in 2005; <https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/cronulla-rioters-10-years-later-speak-of-pride-regret-death-im-not-ashamed-20151127-gl9mrh.html> [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. <http://johnmenadue.com/john-austen-trouble-in-nsw-infrastructure-paradise-part-2/> [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. <http://www.canberratimes.com.au/business/comment-and-analysis/immigration-the-cheap-and-nasty-way-to-grow-the-economy-20180317-h0xmf0.html> [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. <https://johnmenadue.com/john-menadue-cars-not-immigration-are-killing-our-cities/> [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. <https://johnmenadue.com/luke-fraser-australia-is-not-full-but-lazy-infrastructure-policy-strengthens-the-notion/> [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. <https://www.thejadebeagle.com/austral-obscura-2.html> [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. <https://johnmenadue.com/john-austen-the-high-court-the-williams-case-and-transport/> [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. See note xvi and Western Sydney Rail Study (forthcoming). [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. Congestion is increased because the vehicle capacity of the road at the CBD exit/entry, and CBD streets – including car parking, will be less than capacity of the motorway. This is indicated by congestion on near CBD ramps to motorways e.g. South Dowling St Sydney, Flemington Rd Melbourne. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. The M5 motorway has relatively narrow (for trucks) tunnels and a steep gradient towards the west tunnel exit – which is used by loaded trucks from Port Botany etc. There is frequent sustained congestion in the west tunnel backing towards the CBD, which eases considerably beyond the tunnel. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. Road projects, even those supposed to support freight, invariably allow for mixed traffic in each lane. Suggestions to examine the potential separated roads or lanes for vehicles with different operating characteristics have been ignored. See for example: <http://infrastructureaustralia.gov.au/policy-publications/publications/National-land-freight-strategy-discussion-paper-February-2011.aspx>; and <http://infrastructureaustralia.gov.au/policy-publications/publications/National-Land-Freight-Strategy-Update-June-2012.aspx> [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. Traffic funnelling involves closing roads that compete with tollways – to prevent ‘rat runs’. This increases the commercial returns of the tollway, but may have community advantages in terms of improved amenity. The Cross City Tunnel/William St in Sydney is an example. Arrangements for some tollways in Australia have included (formerly) secret agreements with private tollway operators to not operate public transport in competition with the road, or to pay compensation to the operator if public transport does affect levels of car traffic. Several roads in Sydney are reputed examples. See: <https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/committees/DBAssets/InquiryReport/ReportAcrobat/6119/Road%20Tolling%20in%20New%20South%20Wales%20-%20Final%20Report.pdf> and <https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/committees/DBAssets/InquiryOther/Transcript/10707/Answers%20to%20questions%20on%20notice%20-%20Transurban.pdf> [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. Which through small plots and big houses also threatens to create heat islands in the hottest part of the cities – contributing to the air conditioning boom of the last decade or so and strains on power infrastructure. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. <https://johnmenadue.com/john-austen-the-roads-club-is-having-a-great-spend/> [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. <https://bitre.gov.au/publications/ongoing/files/Road_Trauma_Australia_2016_Web.pdf> [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. See note xiv (above). [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. <https://www.thejadebeagle.com/a-tiresome-chore.html> [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. <http://infrastructureaustralia.gov.au/policy-publications/publications/files/ports_strategy_background_paper_20_December_2010.pdf> [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. An example is Port Botany. The State Government had a ‘planning’ cap of 3.2 million teu; in 2005 it allowed a go ahead to reclamation and terminal expansion to cater for significantly more; the cap was lifted in the Botany sale process <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-07-31/chaos-predicted-as-container-cap-lifted-at-port-botany/4165808>.

However in 2012 road planning – for the M5 duplication – was criticised as not adequately connecting to the port, and for not providing assurance that even if there was a connection the rest of the motorway could handle the projected 7.5m teu: <http://infrastructureaustralia.gov.au/policy-publications/publications/files/M5_F3_M2_Corridors_in_Sydney_final_report.pdf>. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. <https://www.thejadebeagle.com/some-thoughts-on-nsw-ports.html> [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
31. While officials were to provide progress reports to the Council of Australian Governments on the National Ports Strategy, this does not appear to have been done. Compare: <https://www.ntc.gov.au/intermodal/productivity/national-ports-strategy/> with <https://www.coag.gov.au/performance-reporting> [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
32. See: <https://www.thejadebeagle.com/governance.html>; and <https://www.thejadebeagle.com/weird-scenes.html> for examples of how the principles were misapplied. [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
33. <https://www.thejadebeagle.com/time-for-federal-action-newcastle-port.html> [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
34. In 1996 State Rail was split into four entities. In 2003-04 three of these entities were reintegrated in the metropolitan area. [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
35. <https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/too-wide-and-long-work-starts-next-year-to-make-line-big-enough-for-new-trains-20170809-gxsana.html> [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
36. <https://www.thejadebeagle.com/australian-infrastructure-plan.html> [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
37. See the toucheth not the monorail series at thejadebeagle.com [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
38. <https://www.thejadebeagle.com/grasshopper.html> [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
39. <https://johnmenadue.com/john-austen-newcastle-port-some-progress-in-undoing-a-privatisation-fiasco/> [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
40. For Canberra see: <https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/25th_Anniversary_Chronology/Federation_and_the_Seat_of_Government_debate> and

<http://guides.naa.gov.au/records-about-act/part1/chapter2/2.2.aspx>

For Eden see: <https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/18212303> [↑](#endnote-ref-40)
41. Commonwealth designated growth centres included Albury-Wodonga and Bathurst-Orange; the former closer together than the 55km between the latter. Eg. <http://www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2014/10/21/4111511.htm>

In 2016 Albury-Wodonga population in 2016 was around 92,000 <https://profile.id.com.au/albury/about?WebID=190>, Bathurst and Orange combined 75,000. In comparison Coffs Harbour was around 50,000 and Port Macquarie 45,000. Absolute growth 1961-2007 is at <https://www.planning.org.au/documents/item/1494> showing Port Macquarie growing the more than Albury and Orange combined. [↑](#endnote-ref-41)
42. <http://infrastructureaustralia.gov.au/policy-publications/publications/Our-Cities-Our-Future-2011.aspx> and http://www.urbanalyst.com/in-the-news/australia/593-national-urban-policy-released.html

It was claimed this policy had no real outcomes; and a successor, ‘city deals’, was more a think piece than a policy, in part reflecting a lack of Constitutional responsibility <https://theconversation.com/new-name-new-look-for-latest-national-urban-policy-but-same-old-problem-59084> [↑](#endnote-ref-42)
43. <https://www.governmentnews.com.au/2018/01/another-city-deal-pre-announcement-time-geelong/> [↑](#endnote-ref-43)
44. [www.theherald.com.au/story/5274881/newcastle-to-sydney-trains-may-lose-an-hour-under-fast-rail-plan/](http://www.theherald.com.au/story/5274881/newcastle-to-sydney-trains-may-lose-an-hour-under-fast-rail-plan/). [↑](#endnote-ref-44)