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# Sydney’s metros: summary business case

## Introduction

This article looks at the summary business case for the Sydney City and southwest metro released by the NSW government in October 2016 and the government’s November 2016 announcement of a west metro between Parramatta and the Sydney CBD.[[1]](#endnote-1)

## City etc. metro business case

### Purpose of the business case?

*‘This publication presents a summary of the Final Business Case that was prepared to enable the NSW Government to make an informed decision on the timing, scope, funding and delivery strategy for the Sydney Metro City & Southwest project (the Project).’*

The summary business case document, over 110 pages long, included an introduction by the Premier and Minister. The government had made a decision to go ahead prior to its publication.[[2]](#endnote-2)

In October 2016 Infrastructure Australia indicated it was assessing the project.[[3]](#endnote-3)


There is a purpose in NSW providing a business case to Infrastructure Australia after a go-ahead decision; to strengthen claims for Commonwealth support via funds or tax breaks. Of course the Commonwealth’s adviser, Infrastructure Australia, should be interested in considerably more detail and much greater substantiation than presented in the summary.

Hence the point of *publishing* this summary is not so clear. Publication does not aid assessment. It would be easier to publish the full business case than create a new summary document. By inference the summary is targeted at the public. For what purpose? The usual purpose would be to gain public support for a proposed decision. Yet the decision had been made.

Likely motives can be surmised from the recent flurry of government promotional activity. Two potential ones: political, convince the public about the government’s wisdom; bureaucratic, create an impression of (public-opinion) pressure in the mind of the Commonwealth.[[4]](#endnote-4)

### The ‘analysis’

The document considered a project of a metro from Chatswood, under the harbour to Barangaroo, then after a left hand turn in the CBD to Martin Place, Central, Sydenham and Bankstown (Map 1).

**Map 1: Summary business case: Sydney metro city and southwest project**

Much attention was paid to matters which seemed trivial or irrelevant. There was considerable repetition. Matters presented as central issues, such as stations, are contentious. Some material was laughable.[[5]](#endnote-5)

The criteria used for station options, which determine the important matter of the CBD route, omitted vital considerations identified in the Christie Inquiry. Application of the criteria was not explained and was questionable in at least several cases.[[6]](#endnote-6)

More significantly, matters which should have been fundamental to decisions were not mentioned. Among the notable omissions were alternatives to the project proposal.

One omission was the most likely alternative to a metro; another harbour crossing etc. for Sydney commuter trains. Another omission was a ‘west metro’ from the CBD to Parramatta which is probably a better transport option than that selected. Also omitted was an analysis of the combined Northwest and City etc. metro projects.

### No commuter rail option?

The most likely reason for not considering a commuter rail alternative is that metro is ‘locked-in’.[[7]](#endnote-7)

A reason NSW feel ‘locked-in’ is a fear of ridicule if (inbound) passengers on the Northwest metro need to change to Sydney commuter trains at Chatswood. In fact this is the ‘plan’ on the opening of the Northwest metro in 2019.

The government may feel there is a need to tackle perceptions well before 2019. The recently opened Epping-Chatswood segment is soon to be closed for around 7 months to allow its retrofit as a metro. Current rail passengers to destinations such as Macquarie University may be unimpressed by this closure or by a new need to change trains at Chatswood once it re-opens as a metro line.[[8]](#endnote-8)

Possibly a reason for the City etc. metro is to attempt to deal with some problems created by the 2012 decision; to allow inbound northwest passengers to continue on the same train to the CBD, just as they can do today with the commuter railway.

The question of a commuter rail alternative to the City etc. metro is important for reasons beyond the vast sums involved in building a metro. If the Northwest or City etc. metros preclude commuter rail options in Sydney many more people and communities may be permanently disadvantaged than those who use the Northwest metro. This is the key issue for western Sydney rail.

Such preclusion is a real possibility if metro tunnels are unable to accommodate commuter trains, and/or the metro takes a particular route in Sydney’s CBD. Thus the difference in CBD routes of Map 1 (above) and that for a west metro suggested in Christie’s Inquiry (below) are of interest.

### No west metro option?

The omission from the summary business case of commuter rail alternatives may be explicable even if poor practice.

However, failure of the document to consider the west metro idea is astounding. The west metro idea does not suffer the ‘drawback’ of being apparently unmentionable and has been recognised as the most likely candidate for a metro in Sydney. Strangest of all was that a west metro was the subject of a state government announcement made a few weeks after release of the business case.

The omission may be as unfortunate as it is remarkable; a west metro might not have created the jeopardy for the commuter rail system that could have occurred with the Northwest metro.

Hence the omissions negate the economic value of the summary business case and, more significantly, cast a shadow over the future of transport in Sydney.

### Analysis of combined Northwest and City etc. metros

The Northwest and City etc. metros should be assessed together since they form a continuous project and the northwest segment is unsatisfactory without a harbour crossing.

Given the Northwest metro $8.3bn cost to date, small catchment area and adverse impacts on the commuter rail network there is suspicion that its costs outweigh benefits.[[9]](#endnote-9)

Were the Northwest and City etc. metro projects combined benefits could also be less than costs. Such a result would indicate an economic case for the state to have adopt a different course for example; commuter rail enhancements such as a second harbour crossing and northwest rail line; a City and west metro or a southwest metro without the Northwest metro.

### Further issues

Apart from failing to discuss fundamental issues such as alternatives and effects on future pubic transport projects, the summary business case did not clearly account for changes in transport operations for operation of the metro. Relevant matters here include whether changes are to be made to commuter timetables to enable metro to offer ‘competitive’ services in aspects such as transit time.[[10]](#endnote-10)

Other deficiencies in the summary business case include failure to specify a benefit: cost ratio on standard transport criteria.


## West metro announcement

On 15 November the government announced a west metro between Parramatta and Sydney’s CBD. Cost is said to be at least $10bn with operations expected from the late 2020s.[[11]](#endnote-11)

### The proposal

The totality of the present proposal is shown in Map 2, from the announcement.

**Map 2: Announced west metro**



Route, stations and therefore likely costs are unknown. The lack of detail can be compared with Map 1 above and Map 3 below. The absence of a proposed route in the CBD is a major failure which underlines serious questions about every metro project in Sydney.

### Justification?

On transport and planning criteria, a rail line between Parramatta and Sydney’s CBD is the most likely candidate for a metro in Sydney. The corridor has the highest road and rail traffic volumes and congestion in Sydney. It is the subject of plans for major increases in urban density.

The need to augment public transport capacity through this corridor is almost universally recognised. Some augmentation is already underway; Parramatta light rail which is to follow a very similar route to that likely for a west metro. [[12]](#endnote-12)

A new rail line would reinforce Parramatta as Sydney’s second CBD. However, the case for a metro is yet to be made; there are strong arguments for a new commuter line rather than a metro.[[13]](#endnote-13)

Nonetheless a west metro is unlikely to create the problems of the current metro projects. Indeed it could eventually undo some problems arising from the Northwest metro such as increasing loads on commuter trains inbound on the northern line through Strathfield.

### The presented arguments for a west metro

The announcement made no substantive arguments in favour of a metro compared with other options for the Parramatta-Sydney corridor.

It repeated assertions that metro has a capacity of up to 40,000 passenger per hour, and one enthusiast claimed the trains could operate at up to 160km per hour. Both are improbable and together almost certainly impossible.[[14]](#endnote-14)

Capacity is determined by what happens at the end of a line; as the CBD end of a west metro is problematic 40,000 is very optimistic.

Other than for short passenger trips the relevant capacity measure is seats. At best theoretical metro capacity might be 11,000 up to 15,000 seats per hour; compared with commuter trains *proven* capacity of at least 18,000 seats which could be significantly increased.

It would be a brave regulator who accepts a safety case that trains on which many people are standing can operate at 160kmh.

### Western Sydney rail study

At present the Commonwealth and state governments are sponsoring a western Sydney rail study.

A recent discussion paper from the study suffered from attempting to confine attention to areas west of Parramatta. Such a nonsensical approach to rail network development was rejected in other parts of the discussion paper for example those identifying a potential metro between the Sydney CBD and Parramatta.

While the study is due to report early in 2017 the west metro announcement effectively pre-empted at least some of its results.

### Discussion in the Christie inquiry

Ideas for a west metro can be traced to the mid 2000s. Map 3 below shows a previous proposal for a west metro published by the state government in 2008 (green line).


Christie’s 2010 Inquiry identified a western line as the highest metro rail priority, albeit a relatively low priority in terms of transport or rail needs. It was to be:

*‘between Westmead and Central station (and, under this “European” scenario, on to Barangaroo via the western side of the CBD, under Sussex Street, with an intermediate stop near Town Hall station)’.[[15]](#endnote-15)*

The reason for the Inquiry emphasising the western (left) side of the CBD is the possibility that a different alignment, such as through the centre of the CBD as proposed by the government’s SydneyMetro authority in 2008, could jeopardise another commuter rail harbour crossing:

*‘The proposed “CBD Metro” route would have jeopardised, perhaps fatally, future heavy rail capacity expansion and congestion-relief options within the CBD and across the harbour, thereby effectively dooming almost all of the CityRail network never to be able to cater for the inevitable and rapid growth in patronage demand in the future’.*

**Map 3: West metro: 2008 NSW government SydneyMetro proposal**



Source: http://web.archive.org/web/20090914165938/http://www.sydneymetro.nsw.gov.au/mediagallery/photo/west\_metro\_alignment/

The line segment in question is shown in red between Central and Barangaroo/Wynyard in Map 3 (above). Note the left hand turn near Barangaroo, the same as in Map 1.

The Christie Inquiry considered this to be so serious it called for an independent and transparent investigation of issues.[[16]](#endnote-16)

### CBD route

Intentions for the west metro in the Sydney CBD are unknown.

The metro proposal identified in the Christie Inquiry continued from Central to Barangaroo, however, this corridor may already be fully allocated; to the City etc. metro. There are now difficulties in providing a CBD route for a west metro. The options to address these are: terminate west metro trains prior to the CBD; share the CBD segment of the City etc. metro; create a new metro line in or out of the CBD.

Terminating trains prior to the CBD or sharing the CBD segment would reduce the metro’s capacity. The latter would see a large reduction in the capacity of both City etc. metro and west metro.

Creation of a new line in the CBD, or out of the CBD perhaps to the eastern suburbs, could retain the west metro’s capacity but at a very substantial cost.

Unless there is a new metro line through the CBD, many passengers on west metro trains will need to change at central to access the CBD. Whether the metro system will have the capacity to deal with this remains to be seen. This would not be so much an issue if the new line was for commuter trains given the multiple stations/platforms and commuter lines through the CBD.

Consideration of a CBD route raises questions about the government’s approach to metros in Sydney: would a plan to introduce metros starting with a west metro have resulted in use of different alignment in the CBD? Would starting with a west metro have avoided claims of putting the future of commuter rail into jeopardy?

## Comments

“If we can’t discriminate between serious arguments and propaganda, then we have problems”*[[17]](#endnote-17)*

### Back to front approach

The above demonstrates the NSW government’s approach to railways, starting with the 2012 decision for a Northwest metro in suburbia, is back to front. A mistake in making the Northwest line a metro is no reason to extend metros throughout Sydney; if this is the real reason for the City etc. metro, the result would be a spectacular example of ‘tail wags dog’.

*Metros for Sydney should not have been considered at all until:*

1. *questions raised by Christie’s Inquiry were publicly and explicitly answered; and*
2. *the Commonwealth/State study into western Sydney rail had been completed.*

Even if there was a ‘need’ (due to matters unrelated to transport or urban planning) for a Northwest metro, rather than connect it to a southwest line it would have been better to connect it to a west line, or to the Airport line.

For Sydney, a very concerning question remains: could a different sequence of metro roll out, starting with the west, have led to a different end result; a result which overcomes fundamental concerns raised in the Christie Inquiry?

This is not the first time a NSW administration has got matters back to front. Examples of the previous (Labor) administration include: ‘corporatisation’ of the railway tracks rather than train operations; payment of subsidies to infrastructure rather than for services. However, those errors were recognised and eventually reversed.[[18]](#endnote-18)

The approach to metro adopted by the current administration will make any change much more difficult and costly, even given that those in charge of operating the metro are likely to do a good job. Yet major changes, even reversals, to the current approach to metros may be inevitable.

### Respect

The approach to metro is suggestive of problems more fundamental than putting Sydney’s transport system into jeopardy.

The metro ‘roll-out’ has been accompanied by failures to take the public into confidence: not dealing with concerns raised in the Christie Inquiry; not considering obvious options; publication of superficial policy documents; publication of a deficient summary business case; pre-emption of the western Sydney rail study; presentation of material which is insulting to commuters.

The Sydney metros will be largely underground. At present, despite recent publicity and media activities, many relevant facts are also yet to see daylight.

From a national perspective the public release of the summary business case creates further doubt about the practices of seeking Commonwealth support for infrastructure projects.

The approach is indicative of a lack of appropriate respect for the public and the Commonwealth.

### Accountability

Democratic accountability is advanced when facts and motivations about government decisions are visible to the public. The deal to constrain Newcastle port, secret even from elected parliamentary representatives, is an example of the opposite.

Accountability is also reduced by diffusing or muddying responsibility. The Commonwealth’s current activities in support of Sydney’s metros undermine accountability of the NSW government to its electorate. This will likely be furthered by state pleas that only the Commonwealth has the resources to support completion of ‘the plan’, or that the state is short-changed by the distribution of ‘infrastructure money’ or the GST carve up.

Some have gone further in diffusing accountability by playing ‘the Commonwealth’s immigration policy is to blame for Sydney’s transport woes’ and the ‘need for infrastructure’ cards. To his great credit, unlike some others, Premier Baird is not among them.

Nonetheless the Commonwealth could and should stand-up to NSW and demand public answers to real questions, rather than just hand over money under the cover of ‘city deals’ or uttering statements that it is not an ATM for the states.

To take such a position the Commonwealth should be supported by a no-nonsense approach to assessment of proposals. This would be unwelcome by some ‘infrastructure practitioners’ who see project assessment processes as something of a playtime that can involve tailoring/withholding information, ‘commercial in confidence’ claims, partial-publishing and advertising in the hope of creating public opinion pressure etc. for more and more projects.[[19]](#endnote-19)

The right advisory response to the City etc. metro summary business case is a robust rebuttal.

The right response to the publication of the summary business case is publication, with equal fanfare, of the rebuttal.

Such actions would likely appal some who prefer discussions about ‘issues’ away from the eyes of the national Parliament let alone the public. Yet such actions may be necessary for advisers to gain respect from the community rather than just the infrastructure club and for the Commonwealth to stop behaving like a banker if not an ATM.

Recent state, national and international electoral events should make it obvious to even the dullest that a lack of government respect for the community is asking for trouble. Infrastructure can cause as much trouble as other government fields.

### Commonwealth action

The power to make Commonwealth funding decisions for state transport infrastructure lies with the Parliament *not the Government*.

Previous articles suggested one Constitution-based role for the Commonwealth in urban transport; for its Parliament to seek to enhance accountability of state governments to their electorates. NSW metro decisions would be an ideal case.

A Commonwealth inquiry into NSW metro is needed; it should explore effects and reasons for the metro decisions. It should also explore options to replace metro with commuter railways. It should be conducted by Parliament.

It would be the ideal New Year’s resolution for Australia.

J Austen

3 January 2017

1. This article follows the *‘Toucheth not the monorail’* series about NSW rail policy at: thejadebeagle.com [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Parts of the summary business case were blacked out – redacted – supposedly to enable the government to achieve value for money in a tender for works then underway. The fact of a tender means that a decision to go ahead had been made before publication of the summary business case.

   Somewhat comically, among the matters blacked out in the body of the summary was the most important item, a benefit: cost ratio. This was comical because that section of the paper suggested the redacted figure to be around 1.5 and the introduction to the paper indicated it to be 1.53.

   If only the claimed transport benefits are used, the benefit: cost ratio would be in the order of 1.08:1; see note x below. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Infrastructure Priority list October 2016 at: infrastructureaustralia.gov.au. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. The flurry of government promotional activity includes: the western Sydney rail scoping study discussion paper; frequent prime time television advertisements about NSW government transport projects; a government sponsored school ‘curriculum’ extolling the benefits of the Northwest metro; the summary business case paper. The announcement of a west metro via press releases and more media coverage (note xiii below) could be added. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. Examples include:

   **Repetitive:** 6 mentions of ‘turn-up and go’; 28 mentions of ‘capacity’; 73 (!) mentions of tunnels; 96 mentions of ‘benefits’.

   **Trivial:** ‘*greater choice of shopping, retail, restaurants better access to health care better access to and choice of educational facilities faster transport to growth areas quick and easy access to recreation and sports facilities.’*  As does any transport initiative.

   **Irrelevant:** *‘Sydney Metro will deliver the ultimate capacity of a metro train every two minutes in each direction under the Sydney CBD – a level of service never before seen in Sydney. Services start in 2019 with a train every four minutes in the peak – 15 trains an hour – on the $8.3 billion Sydney Metro Northwest, Stage 1 of Sydney Metro.’* This is fewer trains than the document claims can be ‘reliably’ delivered by the present system

   **Contentious:** *‘Sydney’s new metro railway will have an ultimate capacity of about 46,000 customers per hour’* (summary business case at p.8). Compare with: *“this new rail line will be able to move about 40,000 people an hour in each direction, delivering a massive boost to public transport’* (west metro media release 14 November). Note that passengers is a misleading measure of commuter capacity; the correct measure is seats.

   **Laughable:** photograph of passengers standing among empty seats on the metro train; the picture of and metro tunnel boring machine under the heading ‘rail network challenges’; the redaction of the benefit cost ratio (note iii above). [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. Criteria were matters such as: quality of transport experience; meet long term demand; support productivity of global economic corridor; implement a feasible solution. As presented they are too vague to be useful, not sufficiently explained and unable to be used as reasons to discriminate among options. See: summary business case at p.47 and p.48.

   The presented assessment uses green, yellow and red dots. Reasons for assigning colours to options are not given. Without explanation some are not credible; for example the implied claim that a new station at Erskineville, St Peters or Redfern would not improve the transport experience is preposterous. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. The ‘alternatives’ to metro considered were: ‘regulatory reform’; ‘bus alternatives’; ‘efficiency of the existing network’; increasing existing capacity to 24 commuter trains per hour per line. None of these are for new commuter lines across the harbour.

   It was claimed that Sydney’s rail future is the preferred option; a previous article demonstrated Sydney’s rail future to be misleading in this respect. See: summary business case at p.44; *Toucheth not the monorail – western Sydney rail* p.6. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. The Epping Chatswood line opened in 2009 ironically with a shuttle service.

   It is to close in 2018, and for 4 months prior to this will revert to a shuttle operation the reasons for which are unclear.

   A new metro line will operate through its tunnels possibly 7 months later in 2019. See: <http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/epping-to-chatswood-rail-disruption-to-last-about-a-year-20150510-ggy5tg.html> [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. Given that the City etc. metro has a transport benefit: cost ratio of around 1.1:1, it is likely the benefit: cost ratio of a combined project would be well below 1.

   Infrastructure Australia previously reported benefit: cost ratios without ‘agglomeration’ (non-transport) benefits in a manner consistent with former Australian Transport Council guidelines.

   The summary document claims total benefits (present value) of $12888m which include non-transport benefits. The claimed benefit: cost ratio for the City etc. metro of 1.53 implies costs in the order of $8425m. Were non transport benefits excluded, claimed benefits would be $9118m resulting in a benefit: cost ratio of 1.08.

   Some comments in the summary raise serious doubts as to whether the claimed benefits are accurate; for example claimed travel time savings of up to 21 minutes are mentioned but not mentioned are travel time losses for passengers on commuter trains which will be required to make additional stops eg. at Erskineville and St Peters (see note xii below). [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. One of the issues with the metro proposals during Labor’s term in office was the idea of degrading CityRail services in order to attract patronage to metros. This was most notable in the case of the CBD metro for which there was an idea to boost patronage by terminating more CityRail trains at Central; ‘forcing’ commuters transfer to the metro. At present there is no information about whether, or not, there is an intention to use similar ideas on introduction of metros in Sydney.

    However, it seems likely that some further commuter services will be degraded to make metro more attractive. An example is Erskineville and St Peters stations (between Sydenham and Central) which are currently served by Bankstown line commuter trains. The City etc. metro will see Bankstown line trains replaced by metro trains, however, its route omits Erskineville and St Peters stations. For these stations to be served, some commuter trains from other lines eg. East Hills, Illawarra, will need to stop, increasing travel time for all those on board – a further reason for the comments in note vii above. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. <https://www.nsw.gov.au/media-releases-premier/sydney-metro-west-new-railway-more-trains-western-sydney>, <http://www.transport.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/files/b2b/projects/sydney-metro-west-project-overview-nov-2016.pdf> [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. Described in *Independent Public Inquiry into a Long Term Transport Plan for Sydney, Final Report,* May 2010 (Christie Inquiry) at: <http://www.catalyst.com.au/>. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. While the Christie Inquiry recognised that if Sydney needed a metro, one between Parramatta and the CBD was the most likely candidate, it did not recommend any metro.

    The optimal type of public transport for a corridor depends on the level and structure of demand.

    A metro could be preferred over commuter rail if passengers are taking short journeys either throughout the day or in both directions during peaks; that is if the primary market was for travel within, rather than across, the corridor. In such a case stations would need to be close together.

    If however, passengers are travelling medium to long urban distances, say from the western suburbs to the CBD and beyond, or on board for trip times exceeding say 15 to 20 minutes, a commuter railway would be preferred to a metro. If the primary market is passengers travelling across (the entire length of) a corridor commuter rail would be preferred and stations would be relatively far apart.

    Given that Parramatta is 25 km from the CBD it seems a commuter railway would be the first option. This would be reinforced if inbound commuter trains are already crowded at Parramatta; a metro between Parramatta and the CBD would not offer ‘capacity relief’ in such a case.


    However, the government is introducing metros that extend significantly further than the length of the Parramatta-Sydney corridor, and in areas with lower current and expected density and potential passenger numbers i.e. Northwest and southwest. It also has raised a prospect of extending the southwest metro further; to Liverpool, and a west metro towards Penrith.

    This appears to be an attempt to serve a commuter market with an inappropriate rail system. The approach appears misconceived from a transport perspective. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Capacity is discussed in *Toucheth not the monorail – western Sydney rail.* It is unlikely that trains would be permitted to travel 160kmh with a large number of people standing. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. Christie Inquiry at p.199. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Christie Inquiry at p.200 concluded:

    *‘both of the original route options for a new CBD and Harbour crossing rail link, along with all other viable heavy rail route alternatives and all viable potential routes for “metro” lines through the CBD in the longer term, now need to be seriously, independently and transparently investigated as a matter of urgency, before the options are forever closed off or compromised by further ad hoc NSW government decision-making’.*

    The questioned alignment is shown in Map A1 below.

    **Map A1: CBD metro rail alignment questioned by Christie Inquiry**

    Source: http://web.archive.org/web/20091004023409/http://www.sydneymetro.nsw.gov.au/mediagallery/photo/sydney\_metro\_route\_map/Hence [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. Barack Obama reported in: <https://www.cnet.com/news/president-obama-hits-out-at-facebook-for-eroding-democracy/> [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. Corporatisation is discussed in the governance article in Federal-State relations at thejadebeagle.com.

    According to the theory, largely written by NSW, government organisations closer to the end-market in terms of high percentages of non-subsidy direct revenue and potential contestability from private firms are better candidates for corporatisation than those more remote.

    As train operations are closer to the market than track access services, they are more likely to be corporatisation candidates; separation of government organisations should only occur where there are minimal inter-entity transfers or dealings and where disputes are to be resolved by courts; subsidy payments should be made to the providers or end-market services rather than intermediate inputs.

    Hence: the 1996 rail structural reforms were in conflict with corporatisation principles; the later decision to subsidise rail track was wrong; bus services should have been corporatized before rail services; ferries should have been corporatized before any other transport structural change. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. **Tailoring/withholding information:** a claimed example is the East-West link of the former Victorian government, see: <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-12-15/east-west-link-victorian-goverment-business-case/5966938>

    **‘commercial in confidence’ claim:** a claimed example is the Perth Freightlink;see: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-11/wa-government-keeps-perth-freight-link-documents-from-senate/6689042

    **Partial-publishing**; an example is the City etc. metro in Sydney, the subject of this article

    **Advertising** in the hope of creating pressure etc., see for example: <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/westconnex-east-west-link-anthony-albanese-wants-auditorgeneral-called-in-20160106-gm0evk.html> [↑](#endnote-ref-19)