# Contents

[Contents 1](#_Toc32438564)

[**Attachment: Sydenham-Bankstown Metro 2nd hearings etc comments** 3](#_Toc32438565)

[1. Introduction 3](#_Toc32438566)

[2. Conclusions 3](#_Toc32438567)

[3. The inquiry process 5](#_Toc32438568)

[3.1 Transcript 5](#_Toc32438569)

[3.2 Comments 5](#_Toc32438570)

[4. Representation 6](#_Toc32438571)

[4.1 Transcript 6](#_Toc32438572)

[4.2 Comment 6](#_Toc32438573)

[5. The ‘problem’ - branch lines 7](#_Toc32438574)

[5.1 Transcript 7](#_Toc32438575)

[5.2 Comments 8](#_Toc32438576)

[6. Options 8](#_Toc32438577)

[6.1 Transcript 8](#_Toc32438578)

[6.2 Comments 10](#_Toc32438579)

[7. Capacity 11](#_Toc32438580)

[7.1 Transcript 11](#_Toc32438581)

[7.2 Comments 12](#_Toc32438582)

[8. Tunnel size 13](#_Toc32438583)

[8.1 Transcript 13](#_Toc32438584)

[8.2 Comments 13](#_Toc32438585)

[9. CBD route 14](#_Toc32438586)

[9.1 Transcript 14](#_Toc32438587)

[9.2 Comments 14](#_Toc32438588)

[10. Long distances 14](#_Toc32438589)

[10.1 Transcript 14](#_Toc32438590)

[10.2 Comments 15](#_Toc32438591)

[11. Sydenham 16](#_Toc32438592)

[11.1 Transcript 16](#_Toc32438593)

[11.2 Comments 16](#_Toc32438594)

[12. West of Bankstown 16](#_Toc32438595)

[12.1 Transcript 16](#_Toc32438596)

[12.2 Comments 17](#_Toc32438597)

[12a Supplementary answers 6 December 2019 - stations west of Bankstown 17](#_Toc32438598)

[12a.1. Answers 17](#_Toc32438599)

[12a.2 Comments 18](#_Toc32438600)

[12b Post hearings consultation on intention to continue rail services to west of Bankstown 19](#_Toc32438601)

[12b.1 Transport for NSW consultation 19](#_Toc32438602)

[12b.2 Comment 19](#_Toc32438603)

[13. Subsidies? 19](#_Toc32438604)

[13.1 Transcript 19](#_Toc32438605)

[13.2 Comments 20](#_Toc32438606)

[14. Expert comments 20](#_Toc32438607)

[14.1 Transcript 20](#_Toc32438608)

[14.2 Comments 21](#_Toc32438609)

[15. Privatisation, property development and Metro decisions 22](#_Toc32438610)

[15.1 Transcript 22](#_Toc32438611)

[15.2 Comments 23](#_Toc32438612)

[16. Stopping the project 24](#_Toc32438613)

[16.1 Transcript 24](#_Toc32438614)

[16.2 Comments 25](#_Toc32438615)

# **Attachment: Sydenham-Bankstown Metro 2nd hearings etc comments**

## 1. Introduction

1.1 This note further considers public evidence provided to the Legislative Council Inquiry into the Sydenham-Bankstown extension of Sydney Metro.[[1]](#endnote-1)

1.2 It principally covers the transcript of NSW Government organisation witnesses – Mr Collins, Mr Lamonte and Mr Parker - at a second round of hearings, 10 December. It comments on some answers to questions on notice to Transport for NSW too.[[2]](#endnote-2)

1.3 Section 2 provides conclusions. Sections 3 – 16 provide background to section 2 by identifying and commenting on relevant parts of the transcript.

1.4 As is the case with all my articles, corrections of fact and interpretation are invited. To date none have been offered regarding my submissions and comments to the Inquiry.

1.5 One update must be noted. In early February 2020, Transport for NSW was reported as issuing options for continuation of Sydney Trains services on the lines extending west of Bankstown. The supports the intentions conveyed by the Chief Executive of Sydney Trains.

## 2. Conclusions

2.1 The transcript refers to unusual governance arrangements for Sydney Trains and Sydney Metro. These arrangements do not overcome an inability of the witnesses at the 10 December hearings to properly represent their respective organisations and the NSW Government at the same time.

2.2 In conjunction with the witnesses admitting they were not involved in (advising on) pivotal decisions – meaning many comments are hearsay - this points to a basic problem. It is not clear the Committee can rely on assertions in the transcript comments without independent corroboration.

2.3 The problem is not merely procedural or academic. There are practical difficulties with claims in the transcript. Among these difficulties are:

* Absurd propositions (e.g. the branch line conversion furphy – section 5 below);
* Misleading comments (e.g. options - section 6 below);
* Irrelevancies, side-tracking (e.g. capacity, subsidies – sections 7 and 13 below);
* Failure to answer questions (e.g. tunnel size – section 8 below);
* Ignoring key issues (e.g. CBD route – section 9 below);
* Contradictions (e.g. long distances – section 10 below);
* Tautology and circularity (e.g. Sydenham – section 11 below);
* Conflicts with official documents (e.g. West of Bankstown – section 12 below);
* Confusion (e.g. subsidies – section 13 below);
* Failure to address criticisms (e.g. experts – section 14 below);
* Factual errors (e.g. content of *Sydney’s Rail Future,* privatisation etc. – section 15 below).

2.4 To be clear, the issues listed in section 2.3 (above) are just some examples of difficulties with transcript claims. The following sections 3 – 16 (below) identify other practical difficulties that should be resolved.

2.5 The most important new information about Sydney Metro arising in the first round of hearings – in November - was an airing of the view some decisions are part of a railways bureaucratic war. That view is more consistent with published, verifiable facts than Government statements to date - and the transcript of the 10 December hearings.

2.6 Indeed, views about bureaucratic war could be reinforced by many statements – and oversights – of the 10 December transcript that is more like a Sydney Metro ‘pep-talk’ than respectful information for the community.

2.7 The bureaucratic warfare thesis is also more consistent with publicly known facts than common anti-metro or ideological speculations about ‘privatisation’, property development, business models, influence of ‘private’ interests, union bashing etc. It certainly cannot be dismissed as a ‘conspiracy theory’.

2.8 Neither the November nor 10 December hearings saw attempts to refute the bureaucratic warfare explanation. There has long been opportunity to rebut – or just directly deny - it. For example, by giving other plausible reasons for CBD route and tunnel diameter that demonstrate these defining characteristics of Sydney Metro have some objective and necessary transport purpose, and that options were relevantly considered. The responses to questions on notice do not address the issue.[[3]](#endnote-3)

2.9 Hence, at present, bureaucratic warfare is the most likely explanation of policy in the public domain. The Committee would contribute to grave problems if it appeared to endorse any aspect of Government policy that advances any such agendas or rewards any such (past) behaviour.

2.10 To bring the matter into sharper focus, an available inference is: the Sydney Metro extension to Sydenham and then to Bankstown was promoted – perhaps among other reasons - to damage Sydney Trains’ system. That it would cause such damage is the point of the document from the former railway executives, whose substance remained unchallenged by witnesses at the latest hearings.[[4]](#endnote-4)

2.11 In my view, the circumstances demand a most careful review of the transcript – corroboration of assertions - against independent sources, preferably prior documents.

2.12 To avoid wild goose chases, the Government should be asked to corroborate the assertions via explicit source references – page numbers etc. – rather than mere document titles. The extent of internal and external inconsistencies in Government and agency documents – for example claims about the contents of *Sydney’s Rail Future* – virtually demands such explicit referencing.[[5]](#endnote-5)

2.12 Without such positive confirmation of claims, the Committee should recommend a stop to all work on Sydney Metro, including conversion of Sydenham-Bankstown segment.

## 3. The inquiry process

### 3.1 Transcript

3.1.1 Questions were raised regarding property development and business arrangements in Sydney’s CBD. There was debate about whether such matters - outside the Sydenham-Bankstown segment - were relevant to the inquiry:

*The Hon. ANTHONY D'ADAM: Where I am going with this is, I suppose, the business model of the metro and how the interrelationship between property and development of property—*

*The Hon. WES FANG: Have we run out of questions about the Sydenham to Bankstown component?*

*The CHAIR: It is clearly related to the business model for the rest of the line.*

3.1.2 The Chair ruled arrangements in Sydney’s CBD were relevant since claimed benefits of the Bankstown extension included matters outside the segment:

*The Hon. WES FANG: I do not think the south-west part could be considered the CBD.*

*The CHAIR: If I could just respond, it is exactly the same as the previous point of order you raised. In the opening statements from the witnesses and throughout all of their submissions they refer to the benefits of this conversion based on the entire network. Very importantly they often conflate the project*

### 3.2 Comments

3.2.1 Matters outside the Sydenham-Bankstown segment are relevant to the inquiry as ruled by the Chair. There are three reasons.[[6]](#endnote-6)

3.2.2 First, effects of and reasons for the Bankstown extension will be an extension of those for other Sydney Metro decisions. To understand effects and reasons of Sydney Metro decisions for the Sydenham-Bankstown segment it will be necessary to understand effects and reasons for Sydney Metro decisions elsewhere.

3.2.3 The second reason is the effects of conversion will spread beyond this segment.

3.2.4 While this second reason was given by the Chair, the transcript does not indicate an understanding of its most important implication. The fundamental question for the inquiry is the effect of this Sydney Metro extension on Sydney rather than its isolated impact on areas and people between Sydenham and Bankstown. This includes determining whether half of all of Sydney’s future potential global arc rail capacity should be dedicated permanently and solely to Bankstown.

3.2.5 The third reason is: the adverse implications for Sydney – especially western Sydney – of decisions regarding Sydney Metro make inevitable a formal commission of inquiry unless the Government provides a compelling explanation - which it has not to date. The present Inquiry will be examined in such proceedings.

## 4. Representation

### 4.1 Transcript

4.1.1 The witnesses indicated they did not participate in (advising on) all relevant decision making for Sydney Metro:

*Mr LAMONTE: I will confess that it is before my time when this was done….*

*Mr PARKER: Sure. This goes back to Rail Future, back to 2012…..through that analysis—and I was not involved in it so I am only reporting on it…..*

*Mr COLLINS* (re the ‘business case’): *I would have to pass to my colleague..*.

4.1.2 It is reported Mr Collins commenced employment with Sydney Trains in mid-2013 from the position of Chief Operating Officer London Underground. Mr Lamonte joined Sydney Metro in late-2018 from the position of Chief Executive Office Transport for Greater Manchester.

4.1.2 In the transcript Mr Collins and Mr Lamonte differentiated their respective organisations from the NSW Government.

4.1.3 Mr Collins said timetabling and planning is undertaken by the Department. Mr Lamonte referred to his organisation as a statutory entity:

*Mr COLLINS: our own people from Sydney Trains and colleagues from Metro meet with Transport for NSW, who have the timetabling and planning function.*

*…Mr LAMONTE: … we are not a corporation. We are a statutory entity but we are within Transport for NSW and within the Greater Sydney cluster.*

### 4.2 Comment

4.2.1 At least in respect of those matters for which they did not claim involvement, the observations of the witnesses regarding reasons for decisions might be regarded as hearsay.

4.2.2 In previous comments on this Inquiry, I assumed the witnesses spoke on behalf of the Government simply by reason of legislative provisions for their direction and control by the Government. Given the witnesses did not participate in (advising) on key decisions, and given the remark about timetabling, these comments need to be revisited.[[7]](#endnote-7)

4.2.3 The relevant legislation has Sydney Trains operating railway passenger services as a government agency whose Chief Executive is appointed by the Minister. The Chief Executive is to take directions from Transport for NSW.[[8]](#endnote-8)

4.2.4 The legislation has Sydney Metro as a government agency corporation to design, construct, develop and operate a metro and have associated ‘place making’ functions. It is able to contract-out, on behalf of the Government, metro operation. It has a board which employs a Chief Executive. The Minister has the power to issue direction to the board.[[9]](#endnote-9)

4.2.5 The apparent point of being a government agency is the organisation has status of the Crown e.g. is able to contractually bind the government in dealings with outside parties.[[10]](#endnote-10)

4.2.6 Given the commonalities between Sydney Trains and Sydney Metro, the reason for the variations in their governance is unclear. In my understanding, the arrangements of such trading organisations – and especially a Government corporation like Sydney Metro – being agencies with Crown status is unsound.

4.2.7 Notwithstanding any differences of opinion on that (4.2.6), the organisations are separate entities with different and at times conflicting interests. As such, in these hearings their executives can either represent the Government or represent their own entities. They cannot properly represent both simultaneously, even though the legislation allows for delegation of Transport for NSW functions to the organisations. There is also a possibility such executives may offer personal rather than official views.[[11]](#endnote-11)

4.2.8 To provide a practical example of difficulties arising: if Sydney Trains and Sydney Metro do not have the rail timetabling and planning function, it is difficult to see how their executives could be in a position to provide official comments on those matters. This undermines the ability of those executives to provide advice to external parties, such as this Inquiry, on timetabling matters such as future train services to stations west of Bankstown.

4.2.9 The significance of the remark about timetabling and planning cannot be underestimated. It goes to the heart of responsibilities, who has been making decisions and on what basis, and who is capable of and should represent the Government at this Inquiry.

## 5. The ‘problem’ - branch lines

### 5.1 Transcript

5.1.1 The transcript re-iterated the witness’ belief branch lines are a problem for Sydney Trains. The ‘strategy’ was said to be: convert these lines to Sydney Metro:

*Mr COLLINS: In a nutshell, to conclude, removing this branch line from the existing railway makes the system operate more efficiently, delivers benefits far and wide and removes a bottleneck…*

*Mr COLLINS: the conversion of a line…… helps us sort out the difficulty we have of lots of branches on the network…..*

5.1.2 Sydney Trains was said to be a core service through the centre – presumably, the centre of Sydney:

*Mr COLLINS: we get a benefit in Sydney Trains of creating more of a core service through the centre which we can uplift and provide a digital service and gives customers….an opportunity to have faster, more direct services into the city on the Bankstown branch.*

### 5.2 Comments

5.2.1 The ‘branch line’ claims are consistent with those of the Government’s submission and in the transcript of these witnesses in earlier hearings. However, I am not aware it if it previously being made.

5.2.2 Such unawareness is no surprise – the likelihood is there had been no such claims. The claims imply an Alice in Wonderland, upside-down, approach to transport while-ever it is believed Sydney Metro has greater passenger carrying capacity than Sydney Trains or other commuter rail system.[[12]](#endnote-12)

5.2.3 The claims are inconsistent with Government decisions such as for a West Metro and proposals for Western Sydney Airport. They go no way to explaining the choice of Bankstown - over say the East Hills Line - for any Sydney CBD Metro extension.

5.2.4 The claims are inconsistent with the transcript of Mr Collins’ comments of three different passenger railway tasks in Sydney (9.1.1 below). Those comments notably pointed to metro type tasks in central, core, areas.

5.2.5 The claims are inconsistent with Sydney Metro’s Corporate Plan 2019-21.[[13]](#endnote-13)

5.2.6 The transcript claims of the corollary of Sydney Trains – rather than Sydney Metro – (just) providing core services through the centre also do not make sense.

5.2.7 The transcripts, NSW submission – indeed all information from NSW - do not show any consideration of securing such core service capabilities from or for Sydney Trains. In fact, the Sydney Metro CBD route may preclude Sydney Trains ever having adequate capabilities in this regard – a matter noted (again) in 9.2.4 (below).[[14]](#endnote-14)

5.2.8 The above points to an inference the ‘branch line’ strategy is a recent invention with no relation to Sydney Metro decisions including extension to Bankstown. Given the evidence of documents and actions, the likelihood is the real policy is for all rail expansions in the Sydney metropolitan area to be Sydney Metro.

5.2.9 The reasons for that likely policy as are unclear as the reasons for not admitting to it.

## 6. Options

### 6.1 Transcript

6.1.1 The Committee sought to understand options considered in Sydney Metro decisions.

6.1.2 The transcript has witnesses stating they did not participate in consideration of all relevant options.

6.1.3 The transcript has initial claims that all options were considered:

*Hon. DANIEL MOOKHEY: Did you at that time, prior to the investment decision being made, model what could be done to the existing line to upgrade capacity……*

*Mr LAMONTE: I will confess that it is before my time when this was done so…. but all alternatives were looked at and reviewed. The option analysis was done, which was part of the business case, and actually that was described in the environmental impact statement [EIS] as well as in the business case summary.*

6.1.4 It was then claimed some options were considered earlier than the 2016 ‘business case’ - in *Sydney’s Rail Future* (June 2012). These options were said to include extension of Sydney Metro to the airport and /or inner west:

*The Hon. DANIEL MOOKHEY: ….When you say that all options were considered, how many options were considered?*

*Mr PARKER: … This goes back to Rail Future, back to 2012, when there was an analysis done about what the future railway would look like. That was where we looked at where you take a line after you get to the city. So the line was identified and where do you take it after the city? There were various things looked at: Do you run it to the inner west? Do you run it down to the Illawarra? Do you run it from the airport line? Do you run it down to Sydenham-Bankstown? Through that analysis—and I was not involved in it so I am only reporting on it—the conclusion was that for both the metro and the broader system the conversion of the Sydenham to Bankstown line*

6.1.5 The relevant ‘framework’ and guidelines in 2016 were said to have required more analysis than required in 2012. The witnesses claimed the ‘business case’ relevantly complied and was independently reviewed in NSW and assessed by Infrastructure Australia:

*The Hon. DANIEL MOOKHEY: But it is reasonable to assume that the final business case was produced circa 2016.*

 *…Mr PARKER: That is correct.*

*The Hon. DANIEL MOOKHEY: As part of the Infrastructure Investor Assurance Framework you are actually required to do a far more substantive options analysis than relying on a 2012 report.*

*Mr LAMONTE: ..The business case was prepared in accordance with both New South Wales and Australian government frameworks. It was independently reviewed under the New South Wales Government's Infrastructure Investment Assurance Framework and was also evaluated by Infrastructure Australia.*

6.1.6 The ‘business case’ summary was said to contain all of the options considered:

*Mr LAMONTE:…..As for the all of the options, they are discussed in the summary that was published in October 2016 and also in the environmental impact summary….*

*The Hon. DANIEL MOOKHEY: In that process, one of them was the upgrading of the existing line— can you confirm that? …*

*Mr LAMONTE: The alternatives of upgrades versus new lines have all been considered.*

6.1.7 It was claimed that in 2012-13 – around the time of *Sydney’s Rail Future* - technology relevant to improving Sydney Trains lines had not been proven. Options for (digital) upgrades of Sydney Trains type systems were said to be relatively new:

*Mr COLLINS: …in terms of technology and going back to 2012 or 2013, at that time the European train control system and the digitisation of an existing railway was really a test bed and not something we had seen across the world. It is only after several years and a number of early projects which now have come into fruition have we seen the possibility of upgrading an existing line with conventional signalling able to be developed into a reality. ….now the ability for global products to be available which allows us to consider that upgrade. That is relatively new.*

### 6.2 Comments

6.2.1 The claims by Mr Lamonte and Mr Parker - all options were considered in decisions regarding Sydney Metro - are novel. The claims are inconsistent with what has been published.[[15]](#endnote-15)

6.2.2 Excluding tautology, the claim all options are described in the summary ‘business case’ is false. That document outlined some options, which may or may not have been considered. It did not refer to many options, including those most likely to be feasible. Indeed, even Infrastructure Australia’s woeful attempt at assessing the ‘business case’ noted deficient consideration of options.[[16]](#endnote-16)

6.2.3 Similar comments (to 6.2.2 above) could be made regarding the environmental impact statements.

6.2.4 If the transcript comments of Mr Collins are believed, Mr Parker’s claim some options were considered in *Sydney’s Rail Future* (2012) is irrelevant to the question of whether options were properly considered in the ‘business case’. This is because Mr Collins indicated some options – of running more double-deck trains via better technology - only seriously arose after 2012-13.

6.2.5 Mr Collins’ transcript comment about timing of the real availability of new technology conflicts with Infrastructure NSW’s *State Infrastructure Strategy*, October 2012. That document referred to the relevant technology as:

 *‘proven in service overseas’.*

*6.2.6* Moreover the *State Infrastructure Strategy*, October 2012, stated in reference to Thameslink, a commuter rail ‘Network Rail’ – not a metro/Tube - project in London:

*‘the delivery of the Thameslink project through central London shows that modernisation and expansion of an operating railway can be a viable alternative’*.*[[17]](#endnote-17)*

6.2.6 Mr Collins elsewhere was reported as noting, in 2013, the ability to run more double deck trains per line than Sydney Trains does:

*"Double-deck trains – go to Paris – see how the RER pounds those trains at 24 trains an hour. The design is different, they're still double-deck, but there are solutions," he said. Mr Collins said he initially wondered what Sydney was doing with so many double-decker trains. "I've sort of become a little bit warm to them already," he said.”[[18]](#endnote-18)*

6.2.7 Mr Parker’s claim regarding *Sydney’s Rail Future* – consideration of options of extending Sydney Metro to the inner west or airport - appears false. *Sydney’s Rail Future* mentions neither. The inner west option was suggested later in 2012 by Infrastructure NSW – in the *State Infrastructure Strategy* - when commenting on Transport for NSW views.

6.2.8 Infrastructure NSW’s 2014 update to that *Strategy* document merely noted - without explanation - the Premier had identified extension of Sydney Metro to Bankstown as a priority. The update made reference to a preliminary business case by Transport for NSW.[[19]](#endnote-19)

6.2.9 Mr Parker’s claim regarding all options being considered appears unfounded. There is not any evidence of consideration of larger tunnel diameters required for the joint operation apparently suggested in 2012 by Infrastructure NSW.

6.2.10 The claim the ‘business case’ relevantly complied with guidelines and was independently reviewed in NSW and assessed by Infrastructure Australia has not been demonstrated and is likely false. The publicly available document summarising the ‘business case’ did not refer to the most significant costs nor likely options. There is no direct evidence of any relevant review by NSW. Infrastructure Australia’s supposed evaluation was a sham.[[20]](#endnote-20)

## 7. Capacity

### 7.1 Transcript

7.1.1 The Committee questioned whether a commuter railway could offer similar train frequencies as planned for Sydney Metro:

*Mr COLLINS: The ability to run a frequent service every four minutes for all those stations—*

*The CHAIR: …..Is it not true that we can have heavy rail running at four-minute intervals, as we have in Chatswood?*

7.1.2 The answer to the Chair’s question (5.1.1 above) referred to dwell-times:

*Mr COLLINS: I think you can to a certain extreme, and I think it is the point that was made earlier: double-deck digital train systems could provide some uplift of capacity. … But you get to a point where, really, you cannot get people on and off those trains because they have stairs and they have two sets of doors. Therefore, the more suitable product, ….is to utilise the metro-style product.*

7.1.3 It was claimed railways are being converted to – and from – metro:

*Mr COLLINS: If you look around the world, you will see many lines being built in addition to the heavy rail network or lines being converted and upgraded in a similar sort of way.*

*The CHAIR: We are also seeing them go back the other way, though, in places.*

### 7.2 Comments

7.2.1 The witness’ capacity comments were careful. They referred to running Sydney Trains’ services to stations on the Sydenham-Bankstown segment rather than on other segments or more generally.

7.2.2 The relevance of the Chair’s reference to service frequency at Chatswood is unclear. The CBD capacity allocated to that Sydney Trains service line is much greater than that allocated to the Bankstown service line. The Chatswood service line does not share a CBD route with other trains. Its service capacity (and at times level) is at least 20 trains per hour – a train every three minutes or less – more than the Chair said currently run.

7.2.3 The witness’ explanation – metros have shorter dwell-times than the existing Sydney Trains fleet - was irrelevant. Dwell-time is included in calculations of service capacity expressed as trains per hour.[[21]](#endnote-21)

7.2.4 Double-deck fleets in some other cities, notably central Paris, reportedly do not face such dwell-time constraints. The transcript response shed no light on whether it is possible to operate double-deck trains without the supposed dwell-time constraints now experienced in Sydney.

7.2.5 The transcript response presented a false comparison. The reason Sydney Metro could run 15 - or even 30 - trains per hour to Bankstown is the new cross-city corridor dedicated to it alone. Were a new Sydney Trains cross city corridor dedicated to Bankstown only, the Bankstown line’s service capability would be at least 20 trains per hour using currently deployed technology.

7.2.6 It is possible a new Sydney Trains cross city corridor could deal with at least double-deck 30 trains per hour. It is also possible for Sydney Trains to run single-deck trains. Dwell-time is only likely to be a limiting issue where there is substantial passenger exchange – exits and entries onto trains – which only occurs in CBD stations. Creation of multi-platform stations for single ‘lines’, as in Paris, would overcome present dwell constraints.[[22]](#endnote-22)

7.2.7 Claims railways are being converted to/from metro were not substantiated.

7.2.8 It is unlikely other governments would allow – let alone seek - preclusion of rail future capacity expansions by smaller than usual tunnel diameters, particularly after the example of Paris in the mid-20th century. For example, the diameter of Cross Rail in London is far greater than prevailing for that city’s tube metro railway.[[23]](#endnote-23)

## 8. Tunnel size

### 8.1 Transcript

8.1.1 It was said tunnels are designed for Sydney Metro trains because there is no intent to run double-deckers:

*Mr PARKER: I think the tunnel was designed to be the right size for a single-deck metro…… We have not designed it for double-decker because we do not intend to run double-deckers…..*

8.1.2 It was claimed the vast majority of trains around the world – metro systems – are single deck:

*Mr PARKER: Double-decker trains are used in some places around the world, but the vast majority of trains—metro systems—are single decker.*

8.1.3 The only contingency planned for capacity expansion was extending train length. The supposed timeframe - in which capacity expansion may be required - is 100 years:

*ANTHONY D'ADAM: … that then forecloses the possibility that with future technological change, there might be a capacity to run double-deck trains down the tunnel, some 20, 30, 40 years in the future. That option is foreclosed. Were those contingencies considered when the decision was made?*

*Mr PARKER: Certainly, when we looked at what system we were going to provide we thought about contingencies, which is why we are starting off with six-car trains, expandable to eight. …. I would imagine that our system will also last for 100 years.*

### 8.2 Comments

8.2.1 Mr Parker’s explanation of tunnels designed for Sydney Metro trains is, in railway terms, tautological. Sydney Metro does not require small tunnels.

8.2.2 His explanation did not refer to cost, technological factors such as necessary alignments, or consideration of options.

8.2.3 There seems no reasonable transport or planning explanation from the Government for small tunnels. Among the remaining inferences is: they arise from a bureaucratic war. Despite this inference being raised in the public hearings it has not been rebutted by the Government.

8.2.4 Mr Parker’s comment - that around the world the vast majority of metro trains are single deck - was fatuous. All such trains are single deck, as that is a defining characteristic of metro.

## 9. CBD route

### 9.1 Transcript

9.1.1 Station location was given as a reason for the CBD route:

*Mr PARKER: …..When we look at where we put stations, as I said, Martin Place is a really good place to put a station….. Pitt Street is a great place to put a station……. We put a station in Barangaroo. Why? Because we have a very big development at Barangaroo. …..That is the basis of the city…… So these are located where we can and there is a process we go through to look at: Where is the best location? What are the buildings we have to take? We try to minimise the take but that is the process we go through to try to get those stations in the best place to serve the people of Sydney and our customers*

### 9.2 Comments

9.2.1 To date the only official reason given for the CBD route is station location.

9.2.2 In the transcript, some Committee members appeared to consider the issues to be limited to commercial development rights associated with station locations.

9.2.3 Mr Parker’s commentary sought to address that matter.

9.2.4 However, a far more significant issue was clearly identified by the 2010 public inquiry chaired by Mr Christie. It has been repeatedly raised since: whether the CBD route prevents any expansion or augmentation in Sydney Trains or any other commuter system in the metropolitan area.[[24]](#endnote-24)

9.2.5 A potential inference of the issue in 9.2.4 (above) being: CBD route and tunnel diameter are products of a bureaucratic war.

9.2.6 Mr Parker’s response did not refer to this issue. The inference remains unaddressed.

9.2.7 The public inquiry (in 9.2.4 above) was so concerned about this matter it recommended it be: ‘*seriously, independently and transparently investigated’.* That there has not been any such investigation is indicated by the ongoing failure to even acknowledge the concern. In my view, unless a satisfactory explanation is made, a formal inquiry into this matter is inevitable.

## 10. Long distances

### 10.1 Transcript

10.1.1 The question of whether metro can be used for long distances was raised:

*The CHAIR: …Are you suggesting that metro can then be used for quite long distances?*

10.1.2 The transcript has Mr Collins saying it is possible for a metro to operate over 66 route km:

*Mr COLLINS: What we are doing now is segregating that product and saying for this distance, which is not extreme—66 kilometres of route is actually quite possible in many cities around the world using automatic technology.*

10.1.3 The transcript has Mr Collins making more general observations prior to the answer (of 10.1.2 above):

*Mr COLLINS: I think the difficulty with Sydney's network—and again I do not want to waste people's time; I know your time is limited here—is that it does try to be three things on one line. It tries to deal with the people who live three hours away…… Then you get into suburban when double-deck is pretty good but they get pretty crowded…. Then they almost become metro-like in the Martin Place experience where it is difficult. …*

### 10.2 Comments

10.2.1 The transcript suggests an inaccuracy in the Committee’s question. The question was whether Sydney Metro can be used for long distances. The question should have been whether Sydney Metro should be used - is appropriate - for longer distance travel.

10.2.2 Mr Collins observation that Sydney Metro can operate over long distances addressed the question posed. It is clear it can so operate. As a single line without junctions, its susceptibility to train delays increases with length.

10.2.3 Mr Collins other remarks were to the effect Sydney Trains double-decks do a good job for two of Sydney’s passenger rail tasks. These tasks involve carrying people who live ‘three hours’ away and in suburbs. The three hours is an exaggeration. Nonetheless, the implication is double-decks do a better job at moving these people than can Sydney Metro. The likely reason is seating is better for journeys of more than 20 minutes, and double-decks (and most other commuter trains) have more seats than Sydney Metro.

10.2.4 Mr Collins noted Sydney Trains is metro-like in Martin Place in the CBD. This begs the question of why Sydney Metro was not extended to the Eastern Suburbs or along the Eastern Suburbs line.

10.2.5 The observation that Sydney Trains is metro-like in the inner city also begs the question as to why two of the urban rail tasks are to be conducted on one type of infrastructure – which can allow metro like operation - while Sydney Metro has its own specific corridor infrastructure that cannot be altered to accommodate other train types and cater for other tasks.

10.2.6 The observations demonstrate the claimed rail strategy – of converting branch lines to Sydney Metro, and for Sydney Trains to do the heavy lifting through the CBD – to be nonsense.

## 11. Sydenham

### 11.1 Transcript

11.1.1 The question of why Sydney Metro should not terminate at Sydenham was raised. The proposed configuration of Sydney Metro at Sydenham was given as a reason for extension to Bankstown:

*The CHAIR: …as we are going to have both metro and heavy rail at Bankstown, why cannot we have both metro and heavy rail at Sydenham?*

*Mr COLLINS: ..that means the worst of both worlds because we still are running the Bankstown line. Where does the Bankstown line go at the moment? It cannot go to platforms 1 and 2 because there is a metro station there at the moment, so we have to move it across to go into platforms 3 and 4. Therefore, it makes it more congested and more difficult than it is today.*

### 11.2 Comments

11.2.1 There is circularity with attempting to argue the segment Sydenham-Bankstown should be converted to Sydney Metro because of the proposed configuration of Sydenham station – a configuration meant to accommodate conversion of the segment.

11.2.2 My comments on the previous transcript and NSW submission demonstrated the presented arguments that Bankstown ‘branch’ trains are the cause of congestion between Sydenham and the CBD to be wrong.[[25]](#endnote-25)

## 12. West of Bankstown

### 12.1 Transcript

12.1.1 Witnesses said the idea is to continue Sydney Trains services to stations west of Bankstown:

*Mr LAMONTE: … we are planning for customers beyond Bankstown so they [may] still have access to train services to the city. More detail on that will be to follow in the coming months…..*

*Mr COLLINS: We are not going to leave people behind and marooned on those stations that are west of Bankstown. For some people, though, who are near Bankstown, the best option will be a very attractive option of maybe one or two stops on our network and then getting on to the metro.*

12.1.2 Connection of those stations with the Sydney Trains network was seen as important:

*Mr COLLINS….a heavy rail connection for the rest of the network is important to maintain.*

12.1.3 The transcript has the witnesses saying there are options for the connection (12.1.2 above). The intention is to consult on options in the future. This was represented as a normal approach to planning for the rest of the network:

*The Hon. ANTHONY D'ADAM: It strikes me that it is odd that you do not have a plan already….*

*Mr COLLINS: Superficially, it might seem like that…..we do have to have a flexible plan. I think it would have been wrong of us, when announcing Bankstown was going to be converted, to have said, "Right, this is the service we are putting on for the rest of the network." … We want to make sure that that service provision fits in with our network.*

### 12.2 Comments

12.2.1 While witnesses said the idea is to continue Sydney Trains services to stations west of Bankstown, the Government’s official documents - which do not show a train line and caused this to be an issue - had not been amended at the time of the hearings. Hence their testimony was in conflict with then current Government documents, however seemingly odd or contradictory those documents might be.[[26]](#endnote-26)

12.2.2 The argument in the response also was illogical. Connection of the more heavily used east-of-Bankstown stations with the Sydney Trains network i.e. non-conversion to Sydney Metro, would be equally – in fact more – important than connection of those stations west of Bankstown.

12.2.3 The reasons given for not having a plan for services to stations west of Bankstown were not credible. The potential service patterns are limited and straightforward. None appear to involve significant changes to Sydney Trains operations. The need for a plan must have been identified as an issue in 2012 – if it was intended for services to continue.

12.2.4 The claim that changing demand patterns justifies not coming to a decision is nonsensical. It is equally a reason not to decide anything, including conversion of the Sydenham-Bankstown segment.

12.2.5 Further, if it is believed – as claimed – Transport for NSW has the timetabling and planning function, none of the witness statements about the timetable west of Bankstown can carry much weight in the present Inquiry. Later, in early February 2020, Transport for NSW was reported as putting to public consultations three options for continuation of rail services.[[27]](#endnote-27)

## 12a Supplementary answers 6 December 2019 - stations west of Bankstown

### 12a.1. Answers

12a.1.1 Supplementary answers from Transport for NSW include eight relating to continued provision / termination of Sydney Trains services at stations west of Bankstown. The answers are to the effect there is no ‘plan’ to discontinue services. They point to *Future Transport 2056* which was said to supersede (at least) aspects of previous statements:[[28]](#endnote-28)

*‘The Future Transport 2056 strategy is the NSW Government’s strategic vision for integrated land use and transport over the next 40 years to meet demands of predicted population growth. A copy of the Strategy is publicly available on the Transport for NSW website. Future Transport 2056 does not include plans to remove Carramar, Villawood, Leightonfield, Chester Hill, Sefton, Birrong, Yagoona from the rail network.’*

12a.1.2 In response to a question about the apparent omission – non-identification - of the relevant stations and line in *Future Transport 2056* (plan) diagrams the answers had:

*‘The plans contain conceptual-level maps which illustrate the future city-shaping and city-serving networks in 2036 and 2056. These future e network visions will develop over time with a range of initiatives identified for future investigation.’*

12a.1.The explanation of the previous transcript qualifier to the continuation of services – in the ‘short-term’- was:

*‘The ‘short term’ refers to services being introduced after Sydney Metro City & Southwest opens. Further rail plans may be investigated and developed as part of the Future Transport 2056 strategy.’*

### 12a.2 Comments

12a.2.1 By going beyond simple accurate statements, the answers introduced doubt, ambiguity and uncertainty as to intentions. For example, it is hard to believe a ‘*conceptual level map*’ would exclude Bondi Junction but include Appin on the rail network. Similarly, that ‘*short term’* is limited to services to be introduced does not address services currently in place.

12a.2.2 Further, the claim a document *‘does not include plans’* to cease services is not the same as saying there are no such plans. In the present case it could equally be – more relevantly - said the document does not include plans to continue services. It is also possible that further rail plans may cancel services.

12a.2.3 The intention, as expressed by Sydney Trains’ Chief Executive, may well be to continue services. It can be readily believed this is the wish of his organisation and himself. However, if his organisation does not have the timetabling and planning function, that remains just a wish. It is up to the organisation with that function – which was said to be Transport for NSW - to clarify the matter. As indicated in section 12.2.5 above, post the hearings, in February 2020, Transport for NSW initiated action to clarify its intention to continue services.

12a.2.3 The easiest and best approach would have been for Transport for NSW to alter the problematic diagrams in its own publication, or at least say this will be done. This is important since it was claimed that publication ‘supersedes’ - in at least some respects - previous statements. That this has not been done after such a suggestion suggests arrogance or the existence of intentions to cease relevant services at some time. Later action to consult on options for continuation of relevant rail services, while not changing that conclusion, is a start to resolving the rail service issue.[[29]](#endnote-29)

## 12b Post hearings consultation on intention to continue rail services to west of Bankstown

### 12b.1 Transport for NSW consultation

12b.1.1 Post the hearings, in February 2020, Transport for NSW initiated action to clarify its intention to continue Sydney Trains rail services to stations west of Bankstown.[[30]](#endnote-30)

12b.1.2 Three options were reported, relating to train routes. Reports did not deal with the issue of train frequency. Reports did not specify whether existing or different train configurations or fleets - for example 4 car sets or single deck trains - would be deployed.

### 12b.2 Comment

12b.2.2 The reports about proposed consultation address the issue of inability of witnesses to speak about the intentions of the NSW Government on the issue of continuation of rail services.

12b.2.3 Despite the doubts raised by other actions of the Government, it can be presumed from the most recent Transport for NSW document there is now an intention to continue rail services.

12b.2.4 That document states 2018-19 was an early planning stage. That is a disturbing suggestion. It means this stage – which is now revealed to be quite conceptually simple - appears to have been divorced from the planning of *Future Transport 2056* and other central policy statements and not communicated adequately to witnesses or this Inquiry.

12b.2.5 Meaningful public consultation on services must consider the issue of timetables: service frequency in peak and off peak; hours of operation; stopping patterns especially on segments beyond the Bankstown line; planned closures. This is not prominent in press reports. The most recent Transport for NSW document indicates this will not be available until after 2021 – with that year being the start of timetable development.

## 13. Subsidies?

### 13.1 Transcript

13.1.1 A question of subsidisation of the line and/or services was raised. The answer related to contractual arrangements:

*The Hon. ANTHONY D'ADAM: Is it going to be self-funding, or is it going to require public subsidy in order to operate?*

*Mr LAMONTE: That is really a matter for how fares are set and what degree of the fare box comes back…..fares are set in exactly the same way as Sydney Trains. The level obviously is a matter for government. The operator's contract…—is not based on patronage. They do not get the revenue; the revenue comes back to Transport for NSW. …It is a number of key performance indicators [KPIs]. We have had 12 million passenger journeys on it so far. They have run 55,000 services….*

13.1.2 A Committee member raised a point about potential commercial-in-confidence nature of arrangements with Sydney Metro:

The Hon. *DANIEL MOOKHEY: On notice are you able to provide us a comprehensive list of what those KPIs are?*

*Mr LAMONTE: Absolutely.*

*The Hon. WES FANG: Provided they are not commercial-in-confidence.*

### 13.2 Comments

13.2.1 The transcript response to the Committee’s question about subsidies missed the point. It mistook financing (the flow of monies) for funding (the requirement for public monies). It discussed a different topic – gross cost and net cost service contracts. It implied Sydney Metro services are provided under a type of gross cost service contract.[[31]](#endnote-31)

13.2.2 Without an estimate of subsidy requirement – how much funding will be needed, irrespective of whether it is provided via a gross or net cost service contract - the State’s current and ongoing liability for Metro will be unknown.

13.2.3 The part of the response referring to passenger numbers was confused. Although it was said the operator’s remuneration is not based on passenger number, the response then immediately spoke of passenger numbers.

13.2.4 The response referred to government receiving farebox revenue as if this was inconsistent with subsidy. Such an inference is wrong. There are many transport contracts where fare revenue is remitted to government yet the operator receives a payment based on passenger numbers. That is the essence of the gross cost service contract where - if almost invariably fare revenue is less than what is paid by the government – there is a subsidy.

13.2.5 The remark about commercial-in-confidence suggests misunderstanding of democratic principles. There should not be any commercial arrangement between the Government and an external party concealed from Parliament. In such arrangements the Government is the mere agent of the Parliament.[[32]](#endnote-32)

## 14. Expert comments

### 14.1 Transcript

14.1.1 Witnesses were aware some experts had written criticisms. At least some of these criticisms had not been read. Witnesses implied the criticisms reflected a limited, outdated perspective:

*The CHAIR: We heard from a number of academics and experts who disagree. They have put forward submissions that they believe that losing the Bankstown line is a big mistake. Why do you think they disagree? What do you see that they do not?*

*Mr COLLINS: I have huge respect for those people who put pen to paper—past executives of the old railway. Whilst I am probably of a similar generation I would say that I have probably worked in another place where I have seen my attitude change from the traditional type of railway to the arrival of a metro-style approach*

14.1.2 It was also implied the criticisms lacked awareness of available technology or of trains being tangled and the wider rail strategy:

*Mr COLLINS: …to be frank I understand the reasoning as the traditional railway people or timetable planners, but I think, with the greatest respect, looking at what is out there in the global market and the modern railway ….—the benefits we are seeing certainly confirm to me that this is the right choice. It eases our problem of lots of trains tangled up with each other…. if you look at the rail strategy beyond, it is planned for the future of metro extending, maybe west of Bankstown.*

14.1.3 The witnesses said the present attitude is to make the best of the current situation:

*Mr COLLINS: …I can understand plans in the past, thought processes of 40 years of experience, but I try and say, "Let's look at where we are today. Let's look at the benefits we get out of a metro-style system." …*

14.1.4 Much of the above focuses on what was initially claimed to be a letter from four former rail executives warning against converting Sydenham to Bankstown into Metro. In fact, responses to questions on notice say this was not a letter, but

*‘a submission on the NSW Government’s Long-Term Transport Master Plan (which has been superseded by the Future Transport 2056 strategy) on 19 December 2017’*.[[33]](#endnote-33)

### 14.2 Comments

14.2.1 The expressed doubts about expert criticisms were not supported by any evidence as to the deficiency of those criticisms or of their authors.

14.2.2 This testimony from the NSW witnesses did not indicate awareness of the substance of the more important criticisms. While a submission to the NSW Government from former executives was cited, there is some ambiguity in Mr Collins’ response as to whether – and when – he had read it. The other witnesses did not say they had read it.[[34]](#endnote-34)

14.2.3 One response to questions on notice - that the submission from the former executives was to a document that has been ‘*superseded*’ by *Future Transport 2056* – raises several new concerns. One concern arises from the inadequacies of *Future Transport 2056,* the processes that gave rise to it, and some apparently varying interpretations of it by Government agencies.[[35]](#endnote-35)

14.2.4 Another concern is *Future Transport 2056* does not deal with the substance of the issues raised by the executives. The criticisms attach at least as much to that document as to the ones it ‘*supersedes’*. It would be misleading to suggest the publication of *Future Transport 2056* resolves the executives’ issues.

14.2.5 More significantly, there was no mention in the transcript of the report of the 2010 public inquiry into Sydney transport, chaired by Mr Christie, which provided great detail and evidence of the major concerns.[[36]](#endnote-36)

14.2.6 The transcript did not provide the identity or expertise of those advising the NSW Government on the issues, or of reasons to ignore the criticisms. It merely records unevidenced assertions that some unnominated experts share some unnamed views supposedly in support of what the Government has done.

14.2.7 Nor does the transcript address advice given to the Government which contradicts Government assertions and counsels against the direction chosen; including from named experts such as Dr Douglas and Interfleet. Some such written, published advice conflicts with responses given to the Committee.[[37]](#endnote-37)

14.2.8 Nor does the transcript address the issues raised by others in this Inquiry – such as Mr Wardrop, Mr Hounsel and myself.

14.2.9 The witness’ presented attitude of making the best of benefits of the current situation may seem reasonable but is flawed. It is unacceptable as advice on public policy. For one thing, little is known about the risks of the current situation.

14.2.10 Most importantly the attitude of making best of the current situation implicitly rewards poor behaviour which at a minimum involves opacity and previous false explanations of public decision making. Worse it may effectively endorse bureaucratic warfare.

## 15. Privatisation, property development and Metro decisions

### 15.1 Transcript

15.1.1 The Committee asked whether the results of the ‘business case’ and choice of Sydney Metro were affected by the prospect of privatisation/private operation of Sydney Metro. The answer was: ‘no’:

*The CHAIR: Was one of the assumptions ….the service would effectively be privatised? …..*

*Mr LAMONTE: that was not part of the consideration of a question of whether it is Sydney Trains in their model or metro.*

15.1.2 Metro was decided prior to the privatisation/private operation model, and implicitly, prior to the ‘business case’:

*Mr LAMONTE: Once we had decided that we were going to have a second crossing of the harbour, that it was going to be done by a single-deck metro alternative and all of the things that flowed from that, which was essentially Sydney's Rail Future through the business case and what is in the EIS and it is that consistent trail that you have seen for many years,*

15.1.3 Privatisation was said to only relate to operation of trains:

*Mr LAMONTE:…..it was simply a question of: What is the best way of operating that line? That is where this particular PPP comes from.*

*…The CHAIR: Operating it from a transport perspective or from an overall transport plus planning, including property development, perspective?*

*Mr LAMONTE: The PPP is simply about how to operate that.*

15.1.4 Property development was said to be under the control of Sydney Metro as a State Government entity:

*Mr LAMONTE: … we are not a corporation. We are a statutory entity but we are within Transport for NSW and within the Greater Sydney cluster. It is also probably helpful to say that there is no planned property development within the tight rail corridor that is Sydney to Bankstown. There are limited opportunities there. Obviously we would aim to support the growth that councils want and support and liaise with the council and the department of planning in their wider aspirations. Again, if it is helpful just to answer one question that came up, the Pitt Street contract was $463 million for a 39-storey office building above the station.*

### 15.2 Comments

15.2.1 Apart from the (usual) ideologically charged exchange about definitions, the discussion about privatisation, ‘business case’ and choice of Sydney Metro did little to illuminate those topics.

15.2.2 The essential question about privatisation/participation is the depth to which private suppliers influence government decisions. For transport this concept is sometimes considered in the STO analytic framework which was not referred to in the transcript.[[38]](#endnote-38)

15.2.3 The STO framework divides transport into Strategic, Tactical and Operational matters. It is held strategic matters should remain with government, operational matters can be contracted out (equally to Government Trading or private enterprises) in some cases, and any operator participation in tactical matters needs careful scrutiny via contract design e.g. gross or net cost service contracts.[[39]](#endnote-39)

15.2.4 If the claim Transport for NSW determines timetables is correct, only the operational level is contracted out from the Government to Sydney Metro and to Sydney Trains, with Transport for NSW making tactical decisions. Appropriate transport governance for that situation implies the two rail organisations should not participate in tactical or strategic rail decision making.[[40]](#endnote-40)

15.2.5 While the rail organisations can sub-contract functions – in the case of Sydney Trains some maintenance, in the case of Sydney Metro train running – public responsibilities for the performance of those functions should and most likely cannot be outsourced.

15.2.6 Hence, there is an in-principle question of whether the witnesses speak on behalf of themselves, their organisation, Transport for NSW or for the NSW Government. This is a problem because their interests – as witnesses of different organisations - can and should conflict. The problem is amplified by witness’ claims to have not been personally involved in (advice on) key decisions.[[41]](#endnote-41)

15.2.7 The discussion about the $463m property development in Pitt St CBD was not clear. It is uncertain whether the question, and answer, aimed at ascertaining whether this amount was used to fund the proposed segment Sydenham-Bankstown. And if so / not so, its relevance.

15.2.8 More significant was the description in the transcript of the Sydney Metro decision-making process. This asserted, incorrectly, the decisions made were essentially those recommended in *Sydney’s Rail Future*. In fact, the preferred option presented in *Sydney’s Rail Future* is the opposite to what has been done.[[42]](#endnote-42)

15.2.9 The transcript appears to include an assertion the harbour crossing was part of this decision-making process and it was to be for a single deck metro train. It then said: ‘*and all of the things that flowed from that’.* It is not clear whether this was intended to refer to CBD route and small tunnel size. If it was so intended, the assertion was false since neither flow from a decision to operate a single deck train. It also was false because *Sydney’s Rail Future* states otherwise in text and via a table.[[43]](#endnote-43)

15.2.10 The transcript then asserted consistency in a *‘trail’* which presumably referred to information from the Government. That assertion is false, as information provided by the Government has been inconsistent. However, it would be fair to observe that the pattern of Government decision making has been consistent – it has favoured Sydney Metro for rail transport enhancements.[[44]](#endnote-44)

## 16. Stopping the project

### 16.1 Transcript

16.1.1 The Committee asked whether it would be sensible to halt the project. The witnesses said ‘no’.

*Mr COLLINS: I do not think so, because my view is that the benefits we will get, and are already seeing from the existing Metro Northwest railway far outweigh waiting or understanding, you know, the changing course mid-stream of this type of railway…*

16.1.2 In response to a question as to whether there are other options, witnesses said there could be, however, metro is a tested product that deals with the ‘bottleneck’:

*The CHAIR: But again—you know what I am about to say—the bit between Sydenham towards the city is not the question. So, yes, we are happy to have that as a metro. We are happy to have more stations. That is great—*

*Mr COLLINS: So what do I do with the trains which are trying to get into the other four tracks?*

*The CHAIR: Are there no other options?*

*Mr COLLINS: There could be options but this one, I really do believe, is a pragmatic, sensible, tried and tested product.*

### 16.2 Comments

16.2.1 The transcript response to the Committee question on whether the project should be stopped said ‘no’ but acknowledged there are other options to the project.

16.2.2 The claim that Sydney Metro *‘is a pragmatic, sensible, tried and tested product’* is not sufficient reason for the project to go ahead.

16.2.3 What needs to be demonstrated for the project to go ahead is that it is the superior option, when considered against all other reasonable options – including doing nothing.

16.2.4 The criteria for assessing whether it is such an option cannot be limited to services on the Sydenham-Bankstown segment. Criteria need to be heavily weighted towards strategic issues such as allocation of a second harbour crossing and impact of that crossing and CBD-Bankstown Metro on the entirety of the current and prospective Sydney Trains network. This implies a proper public specification of that future network – which is yet to be done. To avoid argument on this point, the supposed depiction in Future Transport 2056 is a disgrace, an insult to the people of NSW and utterly fails to identify the most relevant fact.[[45]](#endnote-45)

16.2.5 The most important criterion is: decisions are made in an exercise of appropriate democratic governance. The totality of the evidence before the Committee suggests they were not.

J Austen

7 January 2020

Updated re services west of Bankstown 12 February 2020

1. Submissions 30 and 30a at <https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/committees/inquiries/Pages/inquiry-details.aspx?pk=2551#tab-submissions>

And johnmenadue.com/john-austen-sydney-and-the-mock-metro/ [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. <https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/lcdocs/transcripts/2289/UNCORRECTED%20-%20Transcript%20-%20PC%206%20-%20Sydenham-Bankstown%20Line%20Conversion%20-%2010%20December%202019.pdf> [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. <https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/lcdocs/other/12923/Transport%20for%20NSW%20-%20answer%20to%20supplementary%20questions%20-%20received%206%20December%202019.PDF>

These responses are to questions about the existence of a ‘guerrilla group’ and involvement of certain individuals in pro-metro ‘lobbying’ while employed by NSW transport agencies. These are:

*‘26. What involvement did you (Mr Tim Parker) have with the Metropolitan Rail Expansion Program (MREP)?*

*Response: I am advised: As the Executive Program Director, Mr Tim Parker was responsible for undertaking the initial investigation into the proposed Metropolitan Rail Expansion Program which comprised of three major components, the Northwest Rail Link, the CBD Rail Link and the Southwest Rail Link.*

*28. Are you (Mr Tim Parker) aware of a “guerrilla group” that lobbied within TIDC against the “Olympic planners”? The “guerrilla group” is the pro-Metro lobby whereas the “Olympic planners” wanted to expand the CityRail network (now Sydney Trains) through MREP.*

*Response: I am advised: No*

*29. Were you (Mr Tim Parker) aware of lobbying within TIDC by Rodd Staples and others to refuse a surface connection for the North West Rail Link between Cheltenham and Epping? The lack of a surface connection increased the likelihood of North West Rail being a Metro, which ultimately resulted in the Epping to Chatswood line being converted into Metro and now extended through to Sydenham and Bankstown.*

*Response: I am advised: No.*

*30. Is it true that you (Mr Tim Parker) began lobbying for a single-deck Metro on the North West Rail Link from around 2005 onwards? If so, why?*

*Response: I am advised: No’*

The specificity of the questions allows yes/no answers which do not resolve issues of substance i.e. answers that are ambiguous about the underlying contentions. An example is: whether denial of ‘lobbying within’ is also a denial of lobbying elsewhere, or undertaking non-lobbying activities – such as advising - intended to bring about the same outcome.

Hence the responses do not address – let alone rebut – the inference of bureaucratic warfare. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. Compare a simple yes/no answer with the transcript at p.9-10:

*The CHAIR: There were some questions asked of you last time—and I think there was a supplementary question in relation to the letter from the four ex transport heads talking about the problems that they see if we convert that part of the T3 line. You were asked last time when you had first become aware of that document. Then in the supplementary answers we have a statement that you were definitely aware, I think, by some point in 2017. Is that correct; do you know which document I am talking about?*

*Mr COLLINS: Yes. I can even recall the Saturday morning that I came across the news article at that time which talked about this report, although it was written—and I asked my press officer to get a copy of it because I had not seen that. That was in 2017—if I remember, late in 2017.*

*The CHAIR: Did you then read it?*

*Mr COLLINS: I certainly read the article, and I understood the context of it, but I think that was dealt by Transport for NSW in their press office. I did want, and I asked my press officer in Sydney Trains, to get hold of a copy so I could understand it. I can understand plans in the past, thought processes of 40 years of experience, but I try and say, "Let's look at where we are today. Let's look at the benefits we get out of a metro-style system." It is not as if we see it as a threat. I see this as a benefit for all of us in Sydney.*

*The CHAIR: Did you read that document, though? Have you seen it?*

*Mr COLLINS: In the detail? I have seen the document. I understood the context of it.*

*The CHAIR: So you have looked at it and you understood the reasoning. Mr COLLINS: Yes. But to be frank I understand the reasoning as the traditional railway people….* [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. E.g. See notes (xxiii) and (xxxvii) below. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. See note (i) above. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. See note (i) above [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. <https://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/#/view/act/1988/109/part3b> [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. <https://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/#/view/act/1988/109/part3d> [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. <https://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/#/view/act/1987/15/part2/sec13a> [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. <https://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/#/view/act/1988/109/part1a/sec3i> [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. See note (i) above.

 [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. <https://www.sydneymetro.info/sites/default/files/document-library/Sydney_Metro_Corporate_Plan.pdf> which incorrectly copied the Future Transport 2056 map – by omitting the subtitle. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. <https://www.thejadebeagle.com/dogs-breakfast-for-all.html> at note lxxxiii citing the public inquiry chaired by Mr Christie:

*‘both of the original route options for a new CBD and Harbour crossing rail link, along with all other viable heavy rail route alternatives and all viable potential routes for “metro” lines through the CBD in the longer term, now need to be seriously, independently and transparently investigated as a matter of urgency, before the options are forever closed off or compromised by further ad hoc NSW government decision-making’.* [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. See note (i) above. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. See note (i) above and <https://www.thejadebeagle.com/toucheth-not-the-monorail-metro-summary-business-case.html> [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. [*http://www.infrastructure.nsw.gov.au/expert-advice/state-infrastructure-strategy/state-infrastructure-strategy-2012/*](http://www.infrastructure.nsw.gov.au/expert-advice/state-infrastructure-strategy/state-infrastructure-strategy-2012/) at p212.

<http://www.infrastructure.nsw.gov.au/media/1138/sis_report_section80_print.pdf>

For Thameslink see: networkrail.co.uk/running-the-railway/railway-upgrade-plan/key-projects/thameslink-programme/ [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. <https://www.illawarramercury.com.au/story/2170948/double-decker-trains-were-a-mistake-says-ofarrell/> [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. This can be tested by a word search of <https://www.transport.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/files/media/documents/2017/sydneys-rail-future.pdf>.

For Infrastructure NSW see: <http://www.infrastructure.nsw.gov.au/media/1138/sis_report_section80_print.pdf> discussed at <https://www.thejadebeagle.com/dogs-breakfast-for-all.html> [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. See note (i) above. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. Headways and dwell time, including the published advice provided to the NSW Government, is at <https://www.thejadebeagle.com/dogs-breakfast-for-all.html> [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. Multi-platform per line stations used in Paris and Tokyo are outlined in <https://www.thejadebeagle.com/dogs-breakfast-for-all.html>.

 [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. Cross Rail: <https://learninglegacy.crossrail.co.uk/diagram-of-london-tunnel-size-l-m1/>. Reports are its internal diameters – 6.2m – exceed those of Sydney Metro – and Thameslink - despite it being built for Transport for London (Tube) i.e. metro.

Paris rail tunnels are discussed in <https://www.thejadebeagle.com/dogs-breakfast-for-all.html> and note (i) above. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. See note (xiv) above and <http://www.infrastructure.nsw.gov.au/media/1092/inf_j14_871_sis_report_ch02_web.pdf> [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. See note (i) above. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. <https://future.transport.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/files/media/documents/2018/Future_Transport_2056_Strategy.pdf> [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. <https://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/newslocal/the-express/sydney-metro-southwest-state-government-releases-route-options/news-story/c86eb29f052437e2bab8968bf35f7692> [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. <https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/lcdocs/other/12924/Transport%20for%20NSW%20-%20answer%20to%20QONS%20-%20received%206%20December%202019.pdf>

<https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/lcdocs/other/12923/Transport%20for%20NSW%20-%20answer%20to%20supplementary%20questions%20-%20received%206%20December%202019.PDF> [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. *‘Supersedes’* appears in the response to question on notice no. 19 in note (xxvii) above. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. <https://yoursay.transport.nsw.gov.au/52978/documents/128585> [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
31. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTURBANTRANSPORT/Resources/341448-1269891107889/6914036-1278599591319/7230414-1278599610386/contracting.pdf> [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
32. <https://www.thejadebeagle.com/commercial-in-confidence.html> [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
33. See notes (xxvii) above and (xxxiv) below. [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
34. <https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/lcdocs/other/12932/Sydenham-Bankstown%20line%20conversion%20project%20-%20tendered%20by%20Mr%20Roydon%20Ng.pdf>

See note (iv) above. [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
35. For processes see <https://www.thejadebeagle.com/dogs-breakfast-for-all.html>. For deficiencies and interpretations see note (xlv) below. [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
36. At <https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/37406431> [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
37. See: <https://www.thejadebeagle.com/dogs-breakfast-for-all.html> [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
38. An outline is at <https://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/handle/2123/19132> [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
39. See note (xxvii) above. [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
40. See note (xxvii) above. [↑](#endnote-ref-40)
41. This reflects governance precepts outlined at <https://www.thejadebeagle.com/governance.html>. The application of those concepts to here can be summarised by a simple observation: congruence of interests implies a single organisation. It is only when interests diverge – and therefore can conflict – that there can be more than one organisation. [↑](#endnote-ref-41)
42. To (again) recite the outcome presented by Sydney’s Rail Future (2012):

‘*• In the Sydney context an independent metro system would deliver few benefits in terms of service enhancement, capacity improvements or better operating efficiency on the existing rail network. A dedicated metro-style system would not maximise the use of the existing rail assets. It would create a separate system that would divert funding away from service improvements on the existing rail network and only provide benefits to customers who use the new lines’.* [↑](#endnote-ref-42)
43. While other NSW documents may have attempted to ‘interpret’ i.e. re-write – or ignore – the quote from Sydney’s Rail Future in note (xxxv) above, such ‘interpretations’ of its supporting, explanatory table are not possible:

 [↑](#endnote-ref-43)
44. The tabulation differentiates services (top line) from network. Network therefore means infrastructure. The tabulation differentiates a new network from the existing network. The preferred option is the existing network. To this network there is to be added a new CBD rail capacity and harbour crossing. That is the new CBD capacity and harbour crossing is to be able to accommodate Sydney Trains.

 Outlined in the main document and references <https://www.thejadebeagle.com/dogs-breakfast-for-all.html> [↑](#endnote-ref-44)
45. Among the reasons for it being a disgrace are its amateurish maps and the depiction of Appin being on the future rail network but Bondi Junction is not. Another reason is its failure to identify which lines will be Sydney Metro and which will be Sydney Trains. Yet another is its failure to provide relevant information which can only be found in the Sydney Metro Corporate Plan 2019-21 such as an expectation of at least 210km of Sydney Metro route length. [↑](#endnote-ref-45)